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Synopsis

The introduction of genetically engineered crops has generated widespread public debate.
In recognition of this, there are increasing calls for the public to participate in decisionmaking regarding their introduction. In Australia, the recently established Office of the
Gene Technology Regulator ( O G T R ) is responsible for the regulation of genetically
engineered crops. In assessing the risks posed by the release of genetically engineered
organisms into the environment the O G T R is obliged to incorporate public participation
in its decision-making process. In 2003 the O G T R granted a licence to Bayer
CropScience for the commercial release of Australia's first genetically engineered food
crop, InVigor® canola. Despite assurances of public accountability and opportunities for
community involvement key public stakeholders were critical of the O G T R process. This
thesis evaluates the decision-making process of the O G T R by addressing the central
question of whether the Office of the Gene Technology Regulator fostered genuine public
participation in the InVigor® canola decision. This analysis is informed by a number of
themes drawn from the S T S literature that are specific to the issues raised in this case
study. In the end, it is argued that rather than promote public participation the O G T R
process marginalised such participation in a number of ways, despite the capacity to do
otherwise.
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Therapeutic Goods Administration

Australian N e w Zealand Food Authority

Gene Technology Ethics Committee

Risk Assessment and Risk Management Plan

Glossary
Biotechnology - A broad term that encompasses the use of living organisms in
production, such as yeast in bread or beer making. Also represents the manipulation of
living organisms through genetic engineering.
DNA

- Deoxyribonucleic acid, twin strands of molecules that store information and allow

for the production of proteins. These proteins are the 'building blocks' of living
organisms and produce the unique characteristics that differentiate each organism.
Gene - A small section of D N A that contains the necessary information for producing a
single protein.
Gene Flow - The reproductive transfer of genes from one organism to another.
Gene Stacking - A phenomenon in which a number of genetically engineered traits are
exhibited an individual organism. In the context of this thesis, gene stacking occurs w h e n
crops that have undergone distinct genetic engineering are grown in close proximity. The
gene flow from these distinct crops can reproduce in a single related organism, thereby
giving the n e w organism multiple genetically engineered traits.
Genetic Engineering - The manipulation of the D N A of an organism in order to alter the
characteristics of the organism. In the context of this thesis, the introduction of herbicide
resistant genes into canola plants.
Multiple Herbicide Resistance - A phenomenon in which a single plant becomes resistant
to multiple herbicides as a result of gene stacking. See Gene Stacking
Volunteers - Unwanted crop plants that appear either as a result of seed laying dormant
for a length of time, or from contamination by means of accidental spillage or natural
occurrence.
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Chapter O n e - Introduction

Once growing of G M crops occurs commercially, contamination of conventional crops is
likely to be widespread and there will be no w a y to reverse the potentially disastrous
effects. A s the G M foods infiltrate the market consumers will have no choice but to
consume G M foods.1
Australian Consumers Association
The total acreage devoted to GM crops around the world is expanding. That may be what
eventually brings the debate to an end. It's a hell of a thing to say that the w a y w e win is
don't give the consumer a choice, but that might be it2
Dale Adolphe - President of the Canadian Seed Growers Association
and previous president of the Canola Council of Canada.
Public Debate, Genetically Engineered Crops, and the Regulation of Risk

In the past decade the global debate over the use of gene technologies in our food system
has escalated. The concerns raised by genetically engineered (GE) foods are generating
debate in two key areas: consumer concerns over GE food products and the broader
issues raised by the cultivation of GE crops. Consumer concerns about the potential risks
associated with GE foods have had limited 'formal' success in compelling governments
to either restrict the importation of GE food or to introduce labeling laws to allow
consumers to avoid GE food.4 More informally, consumer concerns over GE foods have
impacted on the marketplace, with some manufactures and grocery outlets boycotting GE

1

Australian Consumers Association, ACA 's Response the the Office of the Gene Technology Regulator on
the Risk Assessment & Risk Management Plan for the Commercial Release of Bayer Genetically Modified
Canola, M a y 26,2003, p 4-5.
2
Network of Concerned Farmers, Homepage, www.non-gm-farmers.com.au. citing the, Western Producer,
April 4, 2002.
3
1 use the term genetic engineering (GE) rather than genetic modification ( G M ) where possible to indicate
that I view this technology as one of 'constructing' new organisms, rather than a modification of existing
organisms.
4
G E food labeling laws are problematic. In Australia for instance, the vast majority of G E foods are
exempt from labeling. These include meat and other products from animals fed G E material, highly refined
products such as oils and starches, food 'unintentionally' contaminated with up to 1 % G M material, and
food prepared in restaurants/takeaways etc. Globally, 8 0 % of G E crops are used in animal feed, and much
of the remainder is used in refined products as oil or starch. Thus the Australian labeling laws do not allow
consumers to avoid G E food in most circumstances. See Greenpeace Booklet, True Food Guide: How to
Shop GE-Free, 2 nd Edition - 2003, availablefrom,www.truefood.org.au.
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produce in order to ally public fears.5 In short, as consumers of G E food, the public has
mobilised on a number of fronts in an attempt to shape the introduction of G E foods into
the market.

The growing of GE crops to a large extent incorporates the same concerns raised in the
consumer debate, and indeed, many stakeholders and members of the public are active in
both aspects. The G E crop debate is necessarily m u c h broader however, as there is a need
to address not only the issues raised by consuming G E foods but to assess the impact of
producing G E crops. This is complicated by the potential for G E crops to benefit the
agricultural biotechnology industry, individual farmers, and in some countries the
national economy. The G E crop debate is thus a critical point of focus in which to explore
not only the broad range of issues raised by the G E food debate in general, but to
critically analyse the junction at which the biotechnology industry, the government, and
the public, interact to shape public policy and regulation of G E foods. It is for this reason
that I have chosen the G E crop debate as the topic of this thesis.

In Australia the debate over GE crops peaked in 2002 and 2003 when the national Office
of the Gene Technology Regulator ( O G T R ) considered the first application for the
commercial release of a G E food crop in Australia. The O G T R was established by the
Commonwealth government in 2001 under the Gene Technology Act 2000 (GTA). The
primary role of the O G T R is to regulate the use of genetically modified organisms
( G M O s ) according to both the Act and the Gene Technology Regulations 2001 (GTR).
The O G T R replaced a volountary system of G M O notification that had existed under the
Genetic Manipulation Advisory Committee ( G M A C ) and the Interim Office of the Gene
Technology Regulator (IOGTR). 6 The ostensible role of the O G T R is to protect human
health and the environment from the risks posed by a number of classified 'dealings' with
GMOs.7

5

Ibid, Greenpeace, Sanitarium, National Foods, and Unilever are examples of large multinationals that
have removed G M O s from their food production systems. Other multinationals w h o are in the process of
removing G M O s from their supply chain are Kelloggs, Dairy Farmers, and Aldi Supermarkets.
6
In Australia there are currently two non-food G E crops grown, G E cotton and G E carnations.
7
The use of the term 'dealings' by the O G T R is to describe a method of categorising the level of risk posed
by individual G M O use. For example, 'Exempt dealings' with G M O s indicates that the use of G M O s poses
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This thesis evaluates the decision-making process of the O G T R . In particular, it will
analyse the role of public participation in the O G T R licensing process for the intentional
release of GMOs into the environment. The case study chosen as a focal point is the
application by Bayer CropScience8 to gain a licence for the commercial release of 7 lines
of its InVigor® 9 genetically engineered (GE) canola in Australia. Bayer applied to the
OGTR in July of 2002 and was granted a licence for the commercial growing of all 7
lines of G E canola on July 25 2003.10 This case study is significant as InVigor® canola is
the first GE food crop to undergo the OGTR licensing process in Australia.11 As a result
the Bayer application generated interest from a large number of stakeholders and

members of the general public. Further, this case study is of interest to this thesis giv
that the newly established O G T R acknowledged the importance of 'public participation'
in science and technology decision-making, and assured the Australian public that it
would act as a forum for such debate.

Stakeholders and members of the public w h o took part in this debate, and particularly
those w h o participated in the O G T R process, have been highly critical of the O G T R
InVigor® canola decision. They accuse the O G T R of failing to acknowledge or consider
what they believe to be legitimate concerns about the risks posed by InVigor® canola. A
major component of this study is the analysis of a number of submissions made by key
stakeholder groups in response to the O G T R process. T o date, there has been little

a low risk and is thus exempt from risk analysis, whilst 'Licensed dealings involving intentional release' of
G M O s pose a potential risk to human health and the environment and must undergo a risk analysis process.
8
Herein referred to as Bayer for the sake of expediency.
9
Registered Tradename.
10
The application number for InVigor canola is D I R 021/2002.
11
Strictly speaking though G E canola is not thefirstG E food crop to be granted a licence in Australia.
Under the previous system, G M A C , G E Cotton has been grown in Australia since 1996. Although it is not
generally viewed as a food crop cotton does enter the food chain as animal feed, as a frying oil or as a bulk
additive to ice cream and other processed foods. A s will be shown though, the debate over G E crops is
often framed by perceptions, and in this regard G E canola is generally perceived as the first G E food crop
to be granted a commercial licence in Australia.
12
O G T R , Media Release, New Gene Technology Regulator Takes Up Position, December 6,2001,
www.ogtr.gov.au.
13
Henceforth I will use the term 'public' to represent both the many stakeholder organisations and the
general public, unless otherwise indicated.
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scholarly analysis of this particular decision. M y purpose then, is to not only document
the decision-making process and the public response to it, but to go beyond this in order
to provide a theoretical understanding of h o w and w h y this particular O G T R decision
invited such public controversy. In order to do this I reflect on a number of relevant
theories from the field of Science and Technology Studies (STS). In particular, I draw
from theories of the Public Understanding of Science (PUS) and Risk Analysis.

The movement to address the issue of public participation in science and technology
decision-making has a long history in the S T S literature.15 Although public participation
is the c o m m o n theme the literature reflects a number of approaches. Rather than go in to
detailed arguments at this point I focus here on broader matters such as the problem of
determining w h e n public participation is appropriate. In their article, 'Science for a PostNormal Age', Silvio Funtowicz and Jerome Ravetz suggest that an 'extended peer
community' is appropriate in making policy decisions regarding what they call 'post
normal' science.16 Post normal science is defined as scientific issues, primarily risk or

14

The following papers all look at the administration of the O G T R in one way or another. Thefirsttwo
look at the InVigor® canola decision in particular. Tranter, M., 'A Question of Confidence: A n Appraisal
of the Operation of the Gene Technology Act 2000, Environmental and Planning Law Journal, Vol 20,
2003. This paper examines the efficacy of the G T A , in part, by detailing the decision-making process of the
O G T R in relation to InVigor® canola. There is also a brief discussion on public participation in the
InVigor® canola process. Peel, J., The Precautionary Principle in Practice: The Role of Precaution in Risk
Analysis for Environmental Releases of GMOs, unpublished paper, Faculty of Law, University of
Melbourne .This paper looks in detail at the O G T R InVigor® canola decision-making process in relation to
the Precautionary Principle. Hain, M., Cocklin, C , & Gibbs, D., 'Regulating Biosciences: the Gene
Technology Act 2000', Environmental and Planning Law Journal, Vol 19, N o 1, February 2002. This
paper looks at the formation of the G T A and comments on the efficacy of the O G T R to undertake a
comprehensive risk assessment in relation to the release of G M O s . Lawson, C , 'Risk Assessment in the
Regulation of Gene Technology under the Gene Technology Act 2000 (Cth) and the Gene Technology
Regulations 2001 (Cth)', Environmental and Planning Law Journal, Vol 19, N o 3, June 2002. Evaluates
the G T A , the G T R , the O G T R , and the Regulator and then analyses the decision-making process of the
O G T R in relation to G E cotton. This paper is highly critical of the risk assessment methodology of the
Regulator. Dietrich, H., Harwood, J., and Schibeci, R., Technological Citizens not Subjects, unpublished
paper. This paper evaluates public participation in the O G T R process by analysing the role of the G T C C C .
Hindmarsh, R., and Rogers-Hayden, T., 'Trust' and New Participatory Forms of Governance for (Bio)
Technological Change, Conference Paper, Australian School of Environmental Studies, Griffith University,
2002. Looks at the G M O debate in Australia and N e w Zealand by detailing the development of G M O
policy and regulation.
Edge, D., 'Reinventing the Wheel', in Jasanoff, S., Markle, G., Peterson, J., and Pinch, T., (eds)
Handbook ofScience and Technology Studies, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks California, 1995, pp3-24.
Details a brief history of S T S scholarship.
16
Funtowicz, S., and Ravetz, R., 'Science for the Post-Normal Age', Futures, Vol 25, N o 7, September
1993.
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environmental issues, in which there is both a high degree of epistemological or ethical
uncertainty combined with conflicting goals of stakeholders. The debate over G M O s fits
well with this definition. Funtowicz and Ravetz argue that decision-making in areas of
post normal science cannot be adequately addressed by science alone and in such areas
non-scientific expertise, stakeholders, and the public, must be involved in the process.
The difficulty with this work though, is one of defining exactly w h e n a science or risk
issue crosses over into a 'post normal' state.17 Moreover, it is also important to consider
in more general terms w h y it has become more c o m m o n for the public to demand to be
included in science and technology decision-making.

Ulrich Beck's work, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity18 helps provide a broader
theoretical basis for these observations. For Beck the 'risk society' is essentially that in
which the discourse of risk dominates social consciousness. Although difficult to define
in such a brief discussion the significant feature of Beck's work is the idea of 'reflexive
modernity'. In short, Beck argues that the dominant risk discourse denies the social and
political origins of risk and elevates the role of science based expertise in both
determining the trajectory of science and technology, and in solving the problems that
arise from them. A point is eventually reached however, in which society becomes aware
that risk is not separate from society but is the outcome of social and political action, that
science is often uncertain, and that society has become distant from, and yet dependent
upon, science based decision-making bodies. For Beck the social response is 'reflexive
modernity', a phenomenon in which society acts to identify and understand the social and
political basis of technological risk. At the same time society struggles to elevate the
position of various social, political and ethical understandings of science and technology.
Beck argues that for the most part individual perceptions of risk are internalised, only to
become apparent w h e n conflict develops over a particular risk issue. It is at this time that
a dichotomy emerges between those w h o produce and profit from risk and those w h o are
17

See Yearley, S., 'Making Systematic Sense of Public Discontents with Expert Knowledge: Two
Analytical Approaches and a Case Study', Public Understanding ofScience, Vol 9, 2000. Yearley uses a
case study to evaluate the efficacy of Funtowicz and Ravetz's idea of post normal science. Yearley
essentially questions their rationale for differentiating the types of scientific uncertainty that should be open
to extended peer review.
18
Beck, U., Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity, Sage Books, London, 1992.
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'afflicted' by, or 'consume' risk.19 The ideas raised by Beck's notion of a 'risk society'
show h o w forms of knowledge, epistemologies, have become the currency of risk
discourse. In the case of the G E crop debate 'reflexive modernity' is evident in the
actions of stakeholders and the public as they resist the dominant risk discourse.

Notions of 'post normal science' and the 'risk society' provide a broad theoretical
backdrop for the more detailed discussion of public participation in the O G T R decisionmaking process that is detailed in the remainder of m y thesis. This discussion adopts the
following structure: Chapter two discusses S T S theory and practice in regards to public
participation. This not only provides a theoretical basis on which to evaluate public
participation in the O G T R decision-making process, but raises a number of key themes
that go on to form a methodological framework for the following chapters. Chapter three
reviews the decision-making process of the O G T R in relation to Bayer's application for
the environmental release of InVigor® canola in Australia. In particular, it will assess the
model of public participation adopted by the O G T R and question its adequacy according
to S T S theory. This analysis will also address h o w m u c h discretion the O G T R had in
relation to public participation, that is, did it have the capacity to undertake a more
rigorous public assessment of this decision? Chapter four details the public response to
both the O G T R decision-making process and thefinaldecision. Although it is shaped by
the methodological framework developed in Chapter two it also has an empirical
component as a number of organisations that took part in this particular debate contribute
their thoughts on what took place. Chapter five briefly reviews the issues raised by the
previous chapters, and concludes with m y o w n theoretical reflections.

19

/ta/,Beck,p46.
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Chapter Two - Theory and Method
As lay publics bring in their ways of defining issues, their experiences, and their values
these deliberative approaches, such processes "de-monopolize expertise" and recognize
that ordinary people are intrinsically part of the technological project.1
Edna Einsiedel et al, on Consensus Conferences.
Introduction

There is an enormous body of STS literature that deals with public participation in
science and technology decision-making. For this reason I restrict m y review of the
literature to drawing out theoretical understandings that are particularly relevant to m y
case study. F r o m this I have identified three overlapping theoretical themes that provide a
basis for understanding the role of public participation in the InVigor® canola decision.
These themes demonstrate both the cogency of arguments for public participation and
various methodologies for improving public participation in science and technology
decisions. The themes are: the framing of science and technology decision-making; the
public understanding of science - including risk perception and communication; and the
idea of social learning. T h e themes I outline in this chapter will be adopted as a
framework in which to evaluate the actions of the O G T R in chapter three, and the public
response to the O G T R detailed in chapter four.

Framing of Science and Technology Decision-Making:

Technocratic framing of science and technology decision-making

The idea that current models of science and technology decision-making are
undemocratic stems from the tendency for governments to adopt a technocratic discourse
in decision-making that marginalises the role of non-experts, or the public.2 Critiques of
1

Eisendel, E., Jelsoe, E., & Breck, T., 'Publics at the technology table: the consensus conference in
Denmark, Canada, and Australia', Public Understanding of Science, Vol 10, 2001, p 95.
2
For a discussion of the concept of technocracy see Elliott, D., & Elliott, R., The Control of Technology,
W y k e h a m Publishing, London, 1976, ch. 3, 'The Technocracy'. For a critique of the technocratic concept
of progress see Marx, L., 'Does Improved Technology M e a n Progress', in Teich, A., (ed), Technology and
the Future, Ninth Edition, 2000.
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technocratic models of decision-making date back to the 1960s but remain relevant
today. Technocratic approaches to decision-making are founded on three key
assumptions:
1) That science is a value-free body of knowledge that provides an objective basis for
government decision-making
2) That decision-making must be undertaken by technical means, in which case the
process of decision-making becomes central and debate over the outcome is denied.
3) That only scientific or expert knowledge is valid in decision-making.

The debate over genetic engineering has generated enormous pressure for governments to
incorporate public participation in decision-making. In the past two decades a range of
public participation options have been developed that are particularly valuable in raising
broad social and political questions regarding gene technologies. In most instances
though, these efforts have taken place quite separate from the formal decision-making

process, and have thus had little impact. The primary reason for this is that in adopting a
technocratic discourse regulators focus on the risks posed by genetic engineering rather
than a broader review of the technology.5 This privileges scientific expertise from the
very beginning of the decision-making process, the so-called 'framing' of issues to be
reviewed. The following discussion details how framing science and technology decisionmaking as a risk problem marginalises public participation.

Information gathered for decision-making is determined by the intention of those making
the decision. For example, Jessica Glicken states that the difference between gathering

3

See for instance, Marcuse, H., One Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology ofAdvanced Industrial
Society, Routledge & Kegan Ltd, London, 1964, Habarmas, J., Toward a Rational Society: Student Protest,
Science, and Politics, Heinemann, London, 1971, and Ellul, J., The Technological Society, Alfred A.
Knopf, N e w York, 1967
4
The consensus conference model developed in Denmark has proven particularly useful in demonstrating
the public capacity to contribute alternate understandings of the technology under review. The consensus
conference model has been adopted by a number of countries, including Australia, and will be further
discussed later in this chapter. See Anderson. I., & Jaeger, B., 'Scenario Workshops and Consensus
Conferences: Towards more democratic decision-making', Science and Public Policy, Vol 26, N o 5,
October 1999.
5
For an example of h o w this tends to privilege a 'risk' discourse in decision-making over broader public
understandings of G E technologies see, Robins, R., 'Overburdening Risk: Policy Frameworks and the
Public Uptake of Biotechnology', Public Understanding of Science, Vol 10, 2001
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information in regards to whether a site is suitable for waste disposal, as opposed to
gathering information about a site that has already been identified as suitable, "is subtle
but profound."6 In the same way, it is evident that the controversy over G E crops is in
part a consequence of the pre-existing political decision to adopt G E technologies, and
thereby manage the risks, rather than to conduct a political debate over whether G E crops
are desirable per se.

Steve Rayner notes that when governments become preoccupied with risk assessment:

The discourse of governance is reduced to a discourse of science. The discourse of
science is reduced to risk. Thus the whole business of government is reduced to a
discourse of risk management.7

As a consequence, efforts to implement public participation come after a technological
issue has already been framed as a risk issue. This works to limit the issues of public
concern that can be addressed in the decision-making process. Rayner argues that the
tendency for governments to frame the G E food debate as a risk issue not only excludes a
large number of public concerns from the debate, but works to support the technocratic
ideal that political and ethical concerns can be reduced to scientific/technical ones. A
good example of such framing is the recourse by m a n y regulatory institutions to
explanations of differing perceptions of the risks posed by G E foods between the U K and
the U S , which emphasise public irrationality or political distortions of science.8 This
framing overlooks scientific uncertainty, divergent scientific interpretations of the
evidence, and differences in public and scientific cultures and institutions that defy
simple characterisations of rational vs irrational.9 It is for this reason that Rayner
questions whether public participation within a technocratic framework is simply another

6

Glicken, J., 'Effective Public Involvement in Public Decisions', Science Communication, Vol 20, No 3,
March, 1999, p311.
7
Rayner, S., 'Democracy in the A g e of Assessment: Reflections on the Roles of Expertise and Democracy
in Public-Sector Decision Making', Science and Public Policy, Vol 30, N o 3, June 2003, p 167.
8
G E foods are largely accepted in the U S , unlike in the U K where the public have strongly resisted their
introduction.
9
Hornig Priest, S., A Grain of Truth: The Media, The Public, and Biotechnology, R o w m a n and Littlefield
Publishers, Oxford, 2001.
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layer of 'technique', a 'crisis management discourse' that m a y actually widen the gap
between the public and science and technology decision-making. T o remedy this Rayner
proposes a 'discourse of mobilisation' that promotes social and cultural norms, rather
than risk assessment, as a means to frame science and technology issues.

Similarly, Alan Irwin argues that reducing science and technology decisions to a risk
framework prior to public participation m a y well distort public participation strategies
into an exercise in consensus building rather than a genuine attempt to incorporate social
and cultural concerns.10 Thus, Irwin is critical of current strategies that incorporate public
participation into existing frameworks and calls instead for a 'reformation' of science in
society that would alter the institutional structures that currently develop and select
expertise in decision-making.11 Irwin draws on Beck's ideas in arguing for not only
political recognition of non-expert knowledge, but for a questioning of science and its
"relationship to other forms of knowledge and understanding."12 Like Rayner, Irwin
suggests that open debate and public participation must enter decision-making before the
policy process begins.

The initial framing of science and technology policy issues is one of the areas in which
democratic arguments play a crucial role. Richard Sclove argues that public participation
must be incorporated into the research and development stage of technology innovation
as:

Decision-making processes are democratically inadequate...unless they are combined
with relatively equal and extensive opportunities for citizens, communities, and groups to
help shape decision-making agendas}2.

This argument is expanded by Frank Fischer who suggests that not only should the public
be involved in the decision-making process before the development, or adoption, of n e w
10

Irwin, A., Citizen Science: A Study of People, Expertise and Sustainable Development, Routledge,
London, 1995,pl44.
u
Ibid, pl69.
12
Ibid, pl70.
13
Sclove, R., Democracy and Technology, The Guilford Press, N e w York, 1995, p 239-40.
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technologies, but that public deliberation must continue throughout the entire process.14
This not only expands the framing of initial issues but also provides an avenue for future
concerns to be raised. The absence of public participation in framing science and
technology issues has been shown to invite controversy and lead to more 'informal'
action by the public.15

Decision-making Models As Framing

For the purpose of this discussion, models of decision-making can be further divided into
two categories; process based or outcome based decision-making. In both cases there are
arguments for strengthening the role of public participation, and yet there are major
differences between them. T o put it simply, process based decision-making is that which
relies on a particular procedural basis to inform a decision. It is argued that
democratically sound decision-making procedures will encourage legitimacy of decisions
taken in the overall public interest, and thus prevent local or special interest concerns
overwhelming the decision.16 A focus on the process of decision-making is problematic
though, as this does not necessarily challenge the technocratic discourse embodied in risk
assessment, and so continues to raise the problems outlined above.

In contrast, outcome based models of decision-making are primarily concerned with
generating public consensus regarding the use of n e w technologies. This is reflected in
the ideas promoted by Rayner and Irwin, w h o argue that public participation will only be
valid if the decision is focussed on socially acceptable outcomes of adopting science and
17

technology innovation. A s with the argument raised previously, the decision to frame
G E food as a risk issue, to be decided upon by a risk assessment process, obscures
14

Fischer, F., 'Technological Deliberation In a Democratic Society: The Case For Participatory Inquiry',
Science and Public Policy, Vol 26, N o 5, October 1995, p297.
15
Harding, R., (ed) Environmental Decision-Making: The Role of Scientists, Engineers and the Public, The
Federation Press, Sydney, 1998. Chapters 6 and 10 in particular document the problems faced by decisionmakers that fail to provide effective public participation strategies in decision-making.
16
Efremenko, D., 'Up the Participation Ladder, Problems of Public Involvement in Environmental and
Technological Policy-Making', in B a m m e , A., Getzinger, G., and Wieser, B., (eds.) Yearbook of the
Institute for Advanced Studies on Science, Technology and Society, Vol 41, Munchen Wien, Profil, 2003, p
26.
17
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broader discussion of whether G E food is appropriate for other reasons. In contrast, if the
focus were to be on whether G E food is socially acceptable, this would expand the
framing of the debate and provide a greater role for public participation in decisionmaking.

Of course, it may be necessary to undertake a risk assessment process in adopting new
technologies, but this discussion argues it is not sufficient. A n expanded debate,
particularly one that takes place w h e n issues are yet to be framed, has the potential to not
only reveal alternatives to the proposed technologies, but also alternative uses of the
technology being assessed.

Public Understanding of Science

Expert vs Lay Knowledge

The public understanding of science has become a major topic of academic interest in the
past two decades.18 The public understanding of science movement was prompted by the
scientific community in response to the lack of public confidence in science, a
phenomenon articulated in Beck's risk society thesis. Initially an attempt by the scientific
community to 'educate' the public in science, the movement also generated S T S research
which provided a critique of the movement itself, and also an analysis of h o w nonexperts, or the public, understand science. Thus, the contemporary public understanding
of science movement is multifaceted and often motivated by conflicting interests.

An article by John Durant, 'Participatory Technology Assessment and the Democratic
Model of the Public Understanding of Science', explores the central features of this
discussion. Durant argues that the 'deficit'19 model of the public understanding of science

For an analysis of the contemporary movement in the public understanding of science, and a brief outline
of the history of this movement, see Gregory and Miller, Science in Public: Communication, Culture, and
Credibility, Perseus Publishing, Cambridge Massachusetts, 1998.
19
Put simply the 'deficit' model of communication is that which assumes public concern is the result of
scientific ignorance, and so efforts are directed toward a one w a y communication of information from
experts to the public.
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that dominates the relationship between the scientific community and the public is
unsatisfactory for three reasons;20
1) It assumes that science is an 'unproblematic body of sure and certain knowledge'.
2) It has a naive view of the public as a homogenous group lacking scientific or pertinent
'informal knowledge'.
3) It assumes that controversy is a result of public ignorance of science rather than a
struggle over conflicting epistemologies, or social or political values.

To remedy this Durant proposes a democratic model of the public understanding of
science which not only recognises the assumptions embedded in the deficit model, but
argues that alternate knowledge be given equal standing in relation to scientific
knowledge in decision-making. Therefore, just as the:

...deficit model privileges scientific over other forms of expertise, the democratic model
recognises the existence of multiple (and occasionally conflicting) forms of expertise and
seeks to accommodate them all through open, constructive public debate.

The difficulty though, according to Durant, is that the current mechanisms for public
participation are politically ineffectual. In other words, whilst the public are drawn into
emerging participatory models, these models are nonetheless mostly excluded from the
formal decision-making process. This is unfortunate as whilst governments' continue to
marginalise public participation, the public refuses to remain on the fringes of decisionmaking. T h e resulting controversy is often ongoing as it becomes difficult for
governments to regain public trust once a controversy becomes entrenched in the public
psyche.

Within the STS literature two studies in particular are often cited to demonstrate the
inadequacy of the deficit model of the public understanding of science and the capacity
for public knowledge to play a crucial role in resolving controversy. Brian Wynne's study

20

Durant, J., 'Participatory Technology Assessment and the Democratic Model of the Public
Understanding of Science', Science and Public Policy, Vol 26, N o 5, October 1999, p315.
21
Ibid.
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of the Cumbrian sheep farmers documents the struggle for local, contextual knowledge to
be heard by a scientific community reluctant to embrace what they viewed as non-expert
knowledge. 22 In a similar study Samuel Epstein showed h o w A I D s activists in the U S not
only contributed valuable contextual knowledge to the debate over A I D s treatment, but
challenged the medical community with their o w n technical expertise.23 These examples
not only provide support for Funtowicz and Ravetz's idea of an extended peer
community, they also highlight the potential deficiencies of scientific knowledge in
determining science issues.

More recently, Wynne has looked at the public understanding of science by evaluating
the U K policy culture in relation to genetic engineering.24 W y n n e found that scientists
and policy-makers continue to construct themselves as purveyors of objective risk
assessment, despite decades of S T S research in this issue. The outcome of this is that
public concerns over genetic engineering are viewed by policy-makers as subjective
perceptions of risk or 'ethical' issues.

W y n n e argues that framing public concerns in

this w a y acts to reinforce the dominant, institutionalised discourse of genetic engineering
and he suggests it is largely this discourse that the public is responding to rather than
"risk or ethics per se" (despite the legitimacy of these concerns in some instances). In
this sense W y n n e believes that policymakers see public concerns as "intellectually
vacuous ethical and trust concerns" which are therefore marginalised in the policy
process. W y n n e argues that public views are thus:

22

Wynne, B., 'Sheepfarming after Chernobyl: A case study in Communicating Scientific Information',
Environment, Vol 31, N o 10, 1989, pp33-9. See also Collins and Pinch, The Golem at Large: what you
should know about technology, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, U K , 1998, chapter 6, for further
discussion of Wynne's study.
23
Epstein, S., Impure Science: AIDs, Activism and the Politics of Knowledge, University of California
Press, Berkley, 1996. See also Ibid, Collins & Pinch, Chapter 7, for further discussion.
24
Wynne, B., Creating Public Alienation: Expert Cultures of Risk and Ethics on G M O s " , Science and
Culture, Vol 10, N o 4, 2001, pp 445-81.
25
Mayer, S., 'Science Out of Step with the Public: The Need for Public Accountability of Science in the
UK', Science and Public Policy, Vol 30, N o 3, June 2003. This paper agrees with Wynne's assessment
here.
26
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27
Op Cit Wynne, B, 'Creating Public Alienation', p457.

14

Not recognised to be what they are, which is public judgements of the quality of existing
knowledge, and of the exaggerated claims made for it by scientists and the policy bodies
they advise.28

Wynne's observations are useful here not only as a reminder of Beck's reflexive
modernity thesis, but as an explanation of h o w and w h y policy-makers fail to consider the
public understanding of science.

Risk Communication and Risk Perception

Risk communication and risk perception are distinct fields of study within STS although
they draw on m a n y of the ideas raised in the public understanding of science literature. In
the main, risk communication research has exposed the shortcomings of deficit models of
communication that dominate exchanges between experts and the public. Risk perception
studies detail the w a y in which the public understanding of risk is the result of a diverse
range of perceptions, not all of which are concerned with the scientific basis of risk.

In their book, Mad Cows and Mother's Milk: The Perils of Poor Risk Communication,
Douglas Powell and William Leiss have detailed the problems associated with the
dominant discourse of risk communication. They argue that the language used by experts
to communicate risk is at odds with the more informal language of the public. Both
idioms are valid but their differences tend to reinforce the dichotomy between expert
views of risk and public perceptions of risk by constituting "barriers to mutual
understanding."29 Powell and Leiss argue that effective risk communication is that which
acknowledges both expert and public views on risk, and thereby acts to:

Manage the tension between these two profoundly different ways of representing risk,
rather than try to eliminate the difference itself.30

Powell and Leiss, Mad Cows and Mother's Milk: The Perils of Poor Risk Communication, Chapter two,
'A Diagnostic for Risk Communication Failures', p27.
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Thus, effective risk communication does not emanate from either expert assessment or
public perception as such, but "exists in the zone that separates the languages of expert
risk assessment and public risk perception."31 Powell and Leiss suggest that if this zone
between expert and public views is not adequately nurtured it m a y become a "risk
information vacuum" 3 2 that isfilledby expert views or public perceptions, but not a
mutual exchange of these.33 Thus, good risk communication is that which fosters
exchange between expert and the public views, even noting that at times these m a y be
marred by misrepresentations.34 This principle of exchange is central to the risk
controversy over G E crops and will be raised again in the discussion of social learning.

The STS literature on risk perception suggests that public perceptions of risk are shaped
by previous risk experiences, such as that realised by the nuclear energy industry or
chemical hazards to the environment. M o r e recently, and particularly significant to this
case study, are food scares such as B S E in the U K and food poisonings in the US. 3 5 It is
well understood that public perceptions of the risks posed by these issues are largely
based on the actions of industry and the authorities that oversee them. Thus, a central
issue in risk perception and risk communication is one of trust between the public and
those w h o manage technologies.36 The issue of trust also provides a rationale for public
participation in decision-making processes as "inappropriate decisions to limit
participation sometimes contribute to loss of trust."

Correspondingly, genuine

30

Ibid, p29
Ibid.
32
Ibid, P3\
™ Ibid, p3l-2.
u
Ibid, p3\-3.
35
The public perception of the risks posed by G E food is often juxtaposed with the B S E crisis. See also
chapter 4 of Op Cit, Powell and Leiss for a case study of poor risk communication in a U S beef scare. For
an excellent empirical study of the risks posed by the industrial food system see Fox, N., Spoiled: The
Dangerous Truth About a Food Chain Gone Haywire, Basic Books, U S , 1997.
36
Rampton, S., and Stauber, J., Trust us We 're Experts!: How Industry Manipulates Science and Gambles
With your Future, Tarcher Putman, N e w York, p 311.
Stern, P., and Fineberg, H , (eds) Understanding Risk: Informing Decisions in a Democratic Society,
National Academy Press, Washington, pi 19.
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opportunities to participate " m a y contribute generally to building trust in the process" ,
whether or not there is increased support for the decision 39

Specifically grounded in the challenges posed by decision-making regarding genetic
engineering, Christoph Rehmann-Sutter and Adrian Vatter provide a more philosophical
analysis of risk communication and risk perception.40 They argue that risk
communication between decision-makers and the public is crucial to public participation
and must be undertaken early in the decision process:

Since the practical solution is predetermined at a very early stage of the definition of the
41
problem, thus causing factual constraints which are hardly negotiable at a later stage.

They also suggest that risk assessment requires participants that display a special type of
knowledge, essentially local and contextual knowledge they label, "the competence of the
specifically affected."42 This knowledge is crucial to informing effective risk
communication between decision-makers and those affected by the decision, who
thereby, "render each other competent."43 Rehmann- Sutter and Vatter argue that this
type of exchange in risk communication, if adequately done, offers the most
comprehensive and legitimate basis for decision-making.

Rehmann-Sutter and Vatter cite Daniel Schulthess in making the key point that traditional
risk had an identifiable culprit (direct risk), whereas modern risk, particularly genetic

3S
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engineering, does not always allow society to locate the source of the risk as such
(indirect risk).44 The reasons for this include:
•

It is difficult to k n o w the risks given the degree of scientific uncertainty.

•

G M O s are living organisms so the degree of risk m a y not become apparent for
generations.

•

There are issues over whether G E foods, if identified as risky in the future, can be
traced given the complexity of the industrial food system.45

Thus, risk assessments of GMOs, "are only accessible on a rather speculative level."46 In
this w a y risk perceptions can be a source of conflict as industry can claim risks are
irrelevant due to the lack of knowledge, whilst environmental and activist groups see risk
as an outcome of the lack of knowledge.47

Rehmann-Sutter and Vatter also distinguish between two types of risk perception, in
short, the difference between the perceptions of those w h o are undertaking the risk and
those w h o are having the risk imposed upon them. In this way, "risk impositions cannot
be assessed with the same rationality as risk undertakings."48 This leads to conflict over
w h o should m a k e decisions on risky issues such as G E technologies, and provides
justification for public participation in identifying risk as, " A risk imposition cannot have
moral authority if those highly affected by the risks were not allowed to participate in the
deciding procedure."49

Social Learning

Exchanging Knowledge Through Public Participation

44
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The preceding discussion in this chapter shows h o w the tendency for governments to
adopt a technocratic discourse in decision-making processes leads to a dichotomy
between expert and non-expert knowledge. In response, a recent body of research within
S T S defines, and proposes, 'social learning' as a strategy for exchanging expert and nonexpert knowledge within a public participation framework.50 Dimitri Efremenko declares,
"the essence of social learning is a reflexive synthesis of visions, values, and purposes of
actors and affected groups."51 The optimum goal for social learning is that conflicting
viewpoints would have equal political standing in the decision-making arena. The
measure of social learning resulting from public participation could be used to assess the
legitimacy of the process, as a failure to generate n e w knowledge indicates a poor level of
public participation. Whilst opening up technological debates to a broad range of
conflicting epistemologies would appear to invite increased dissent, it is nonetheless
preferable to dissent taking place outside of the decision-making arena, which tends to
reinforce existing expert/non-expert dichotomies.

Recently, the UK Economic and Social Research Council has begun a study of what they
call Deliberative and Inclusionary Processes (DIPs).

These include focus groups,

citizen's juries, consensus conferences, stakeholder decision analysis and deliberative
polling. The primary aim of DIPs is to not only gauge public perceptions of contentious
risk issues, but to develop mechanisms for an exchange of knowledge between expert and
non-expert groups. This interaction has the potential to facilitate social learning by
producing n e w knowledge through a synthesis of existing views.

The potential for public participation strategies to produce legitimate knowledge has
already been played out in the Australian context. In March of 1999 Australia held a

Op Cit, Efremenko, p 28. See also Hennen, L., 'Participatory Technology Assessment: A Response to
Technical Modernity', Science and Public Policy, Vol 26, N o 5, October 1999, p309. Hennen refers to the
practice of social learning as leading to "extended peer communities".
*' Op Cit, Efremenko, p 27.
52
E S R C Global Environmental Change Programme, The Politics of GM Food: Risk, Science and Public
Trust, Special Briefing N o 5, University of Sussex, 1999, p 15.
53
See Wynne, B., 'Technology Assessment and Reflexive Social Learning: Observations from the Risk
Field', in Rip, A., Misa, T., & Schot, J., Managing Technology in Society: The Approach of Constructive
Technology Assessment, Pinter Publishers, London, 1995.
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participatory technology assessment on G M O s in the food system. The Australian
conference w a s held in conjunction with consensus conferences in both D e n m a r k and
Canada on the same issue. A subsequent paper by Edna Einsiedel et al, 'Publics at the
Technology Table: the Consensus Conference in Denmark, Canada, and Australia', found
that despite culturally motivated differences, the issues raised by the lay panel in each
case were remarkably similar.54 So too, were the recommendations they made. In their
conclusion, Einsiedel et al noted that all three consensus conferences challenged the
technocratic/risk discourse that underpins the introduction of gene technologies, and all
three stressed the importance of social, political, and economic issues in G M food
debates. In closing, they stated:

What we have, in essence, is a convergence in "frames of meaning" about a technological
artefact (in this case, food biotechnology) from groups of lay citizens.55

The Australian Lay Panel Report that resulted from the Consensus Conference is
significant as it demonstrates public understanding of m a n y of the issues raised in this
chapter. O n e of the key recommendations m a d e by the Lay Panel is clearly calling for a
process of social learning to inform decision-making:

Government should establish a mechanism similar to the model of the Consensus
Conference, to bring together consisting of industry, consumer groups, critics, other
experts and Australian lay people. This would ensure that dialogue between all of these
groups would lead to better government decisions.56

As an exercise in the efficacy of public participation techniques to generate valuable
knowledge the Australian Consensus Conference is significant. T h e lay panel
demonstrated that non-expert public individuals have the capacity to absorb and exchange
knowledge in a short time frame. Not only that, the concerns raised in the Lay Panel

54
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Report were consistent with those identified in the wider Australian community,

which

suggests that consensus conferences are a legitimate forum for voicing public concerns in
the debate over G E foods, and promoting social learning between experts, decisionmakers, and the public.

Conclusion

This chapter has raised a number of key themes in the STS literature that focus on public
participation in science and technology decision-making. Framing of science and
technology at each point of decision-making is clearly a crucial opportunity to
incorporate public or non-expert knowledge in the process. Public debate and formal
assessment of n e w technologies must include discussion of socially acceptable outcomes
to expand and strengthen decision-making. It was argued that deficit models of the public
understanding of science and risk communication make a number of false assumptions in
relation to both science and the public. The dichotomy between expert and non-expert
epistemologies emerges as a central problem for public participation. It was shown that
social learning has the potential to close the 'gap' between expert and non-expert
epistemologies. According to this chapter then, decision-makers seeking to promote
sound public participation must encompass the three themes outlined in this chapter:
1) Allow public views an opportunity to 'frame' the issues to be addressed in decisionmaking.
2) Display a more sophisticated attitude to the 'public understanding of science' and risk
communication.
3) Provide opportunities for 'social learning', an exchange between the policy-makers,
scientists, industry and the public, such that n e w understandings are realised and
promoted in decision-making.

Chin, G., 'The Role of Public Participation in the Genetically Modified Organisms Debate',
Environmental and Planning Law Journal, Vol 17, N o 6, December 2000, p 533, notes that the lay panel in
this case raised similar concerns to those already outlined in public surveys and Biotechnology Australia
focus groups.
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In setting the framework for the following two chapters this discussion makes the critical
point that adopting a technocratic discourse in decision-making, in particular, the
tendency to reduce decision-making to a risk assessment process, does not provide an
adequate forum for genuine public participation. With this in mind the following chapter
evaluates the decision-making process adopted by the O G T R in relation to the
commercial release of G E crops in Australia.
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Chapter Three - The O G T R and Public Participation
The next five years will see a plethora of new ideas and new products emerging in the
market-place. I believe that the members of each society must decide the limits on the use
of any technology, both individually and collectively. Each country must hold its own
discussion at grassroots level, support and guide its own scientists in their research and
decide on its own pathway in G M technology.1
Dr Jean Fleming, member of New Zealand's Royal Commission on Genetic Modification
Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to critically evaluate a single decision-making process by
the O G T R for the commercial release of G M O s in Australia. This process took place over
a one year period, beginning with the initial application in July of 2002, and ending with
the issuing of a licence on July 25, 2003. This decision was significant not only as the
first such decision by the O G T R regarding the commercial release of a G E food crop in
Australia, but also as a test case for h o w well the O G T R lived up to its stated aim of
incorporating public participation in its decision-making process.

The decision-making environment for the release of GMOs in Australia underwent major
changes in 2001. T h e previous volountary systems, the Interim Office of the Gene
Technology Regulator ( I O G T R ) and its predecessor, the Gene Manipulation Advisory
Committee ( G M A C ) were replaced by a nationally consistent, compulsory process
administered by the O G T R . The role of the O G T R is to regulate G M O dealings under the
Gene Technology Act 2000 ( G T A ) , and according to the Gene Technology Regulations
2001 ( G T R ) , and to provide information to other regulatory agencies and the public. The
O G T R does not determine decisions as such, but supports the Gene, Technology
Regulator (Regulator) in making decisions according to the G T A .

A major component of this new regulatory system was that decision-making was to be a
publicly transparent process and 'an important forum' for public debate. Moreover, the
n e w Regulator acknowledged that science and technology play a critical role in shaping
1

Fleming, J., 'Inform, Educate or Influence?: New Zealand's Experience of the Debate on Genetic
Modification, The Round Table, Vol 371, September 2003.
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society, and for this reason declared that: "It is important that w e increase public
participation in decision-making regarding their use."2 In developing the n e w regulatory
regime the Commonwealth government advocated strategies that included consultation
with; " a broad range of non-government stakeholders to determine h o w ethical and
socio-economic issues can be incorporated in the regulatory process."3 Thus, it is evident
that the O G T R and the Commonwealth government recognised the social and political
need for increased public participation in decision-making. A s a consequence, this
chapter will explore not only the mechanisms put in place to foster public participation by
the O G T R , but h o w these mechanisms can be understood according to the key principles
outlined in chapter two.

The case study chosen here is an application by Bayer CropScience to release 7 lines of
G M canola for commercial cropping in Australia. These 7 lines are all genetically
engineered to resist the application of Bayer CropScience Liberty™ herbicide.4 All 7
lines are marketed under the InVigor® canola, and all 7 had previously been trialed
"under limited and controlled conditions" in Australia.5 Furthermore, all 7 lines had
previously been approved for h u m a n consumption by the Australian N e w Zealand Food
Authority ( A N Z F A ) , n o w k n o w n as Food Standards Australia N e w Zealand (FSANZ). 6
That InVigor® canola was already approved by F S A N Z raised a critical point in this
particular debate. Essentially it highlighted the inconsistency in the Australian regulatory
environment regarding G M O s , as different government agencies oversee different
2

O G T R Media Release, New Gene Technology Regulator Takes Up Position, December 6, 2001.
Commonwealth of Australia, Australian Biotechnology 2000: A National Strategy, 2000, pi 7.
4
B y entering into a contract with Bayer to farm InVigor® canola farmers are contractually obliged to only
use Bayer supplied chemicals on their crops, in this case glusofinate a m m o n i u m which is marketed by
Bayer as Liberty herbicide. All large agricultural biotechnology corporations have similar contractual
agreements in place. In fact, the tendency for corporations such as Bayer and Monsanto to focus their
research on herbicide resistant crops is seen by some to be a m o v e to protect their herbicide market share.
5
O G T R , Decision on Issuing a Licence for Application DIR 021/2002 for Commercial Release of Bayer
InVigor Canola, www.ogtr.gov.au. The inadequacy of this as an indication of the behaviour of G E crops in
the environment is detailed later in this chapter
6
There is m u c h criticism of the fact that F S A N Z does not have an adequate process in place to conduct
rigorous assessment of the risks of G M O s in the food chain. See Hain, M., Cocklin, C , and Gibbs, D.,
'Regulating Biosciences: The Gene Technology Act 2000', Environmental and Planning Law Journal, Vol
19, N o 1, February 2001, p 177. See also N S W Hansard, Interim Report: Genetically Modified Food,
Standing Committee on State Development, p 1, which notes that rather than develop an innovative
approach to regulation, " A N Z F A [previous title for F S A N Z ] merely assesses G E foods from data supplied
by corporations promoting the technology."
3
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elements of decision-making regarding each G M O . 7 These agencies; ( F S A N Z ) , the
Australian Pesticides and Veterinary Medicines Authority, ( A P V M A ) formerly the
National Registration Authority for Agricultural and Veterinary Chemicals ( N R A ) , and
the Therapeutic Goods Administration (TGA), have their own regulatory regime quite
distinct from the OGTR.8 Essentially, the OGTR regulates the research and development
of G M O s , whilst the existing bodies largely regulate the end use of G M O technology.

The decision by the Australian Government to adopt a 'gapfiller'approach to G M O

regulation has implications for public participation in decision-making. Essentially, ma
public concerns do not fall within the OGTR parameters and as the previous agencies do
not have participatory mechanisms in place the public is excluded from these decisions.
For instance, the OGTR deferred to the FSANZ decision in relation to the use of
InVigor® canola in food, thereby excluding a number of consumer health issues from
public debate in the OGTR assessment. Similarly, widespread public concerns over
increased herbicide use on GE crops are not open to public debate through the OGTR as
they are administered by APVMA.9

Framing of Science and Technology Decision-Making

The Objective and Practice of the Office of the Gene Technology Regulator

Before analysing the broader issues of framing, in particular, the decision to frame the
O G T R regulatory process within a narrow technocratic/risk assessment, I willfirstlook at

7

A similar multi-agency approach was adopted by the E U in the mid 1990s, raising similar concerns.
Levidow, L., Carr, S., von Schomberg, R., & Wield, D., 'Bounding the Risk Assessment of a HerbicideTolerant Crop', in van Dommelen, A., (ed.) Coping With Deliberate Release: the Limits of Risk
Assessment, International Centre For H u m a n and Public Affairs, The Netherlands, p 97-9 Details a study of
the E U approach and notes that the decision to 'fragment' the regulation of G M O s meant that the process of
regulating G M O s could operate "for granting market approval, while deferring awkward uncertainties
about h o w to predict and avert some plausible effects." This meant that many issues of public concern lay
beyond the scope of the n e w legislation as they were administered by existing legislation.
8
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9
For example, at some points in the R A R M P the O G T R does identify risk hazards and yet as they do not
pose a direct threat to human health or the environment they are not considered risks as such, but rather the
concern of these other agencies.
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the objective of the O G T R as it is directed by the G T A , and also h o w the O G T R pursues
its objective given the parameters of the G T A and the G T R .

The primary objective of the GTA, and thereby the OGTR, is to establish a national
regulatory system:

To protect the health and safety of people, and to protect the environment, by identifying
risks posed by or as a result of gene technology, and by managing those risks through
regulating certain dealings with GMOs. 1 0

Clearly, the ostensible purpose of the OGTR is to identify and manage the risks posed by
G M technology to h u m a n health and the environment. A s Glicken pointed out in the
previous chapter though, gathering information to identify the risks posed after a
technology is decided upon is profoundly different to gathering information to determine
the risks posed by a technology per se. Thus, the political will to adopt G E technologies
and thereby "assist the biotechnology industry to maximise its contribution to the
Australian economy" 11 is evident in the Australian government's decision to 'manage
risks' rather than conduct a public debate over whether G E technologies are desirable in
thefirstplace.

The best indication of how the OGTR interprets its role under the Act is documented in
the Risk Analysis Framework

for Licence Applications to the Office of the Gene

Technology Regulator (RAF), prepared by the O G T R to guide the process. Within this
R A F the O G T R has four categories of authorisation in G M O dealings.13 In the case of
licence applications for 'Dealings Involving the Intentional Release of G M O s ' , the
10

Gene Technology Act 2000, Section 2, Object of Act.
Costello, P., Budget Speech 1999-2000, Commonwealth of Australia, M a y 11, 1999.
12
This point is revisited in a brief discussion at the end of this chapter. It documents the N e w Zealand
decision to conduct a comprehensive public debate through holding a Royal Commission on G E .
13
In undertaking a risk assessment process under the G T A the O G T R has four categories of authorisation
in G M O dealings, they are: Exempt Dealings With G M O s - these do not require a licence, Notifiable L o w
Risk Dealings - These do not require a licence but must be contained and not released into the
environment, Licensed Dealings with G M O s Not Involving Intentional Release - These must undergo a
risk assessment process but must be contained and not released into the environment, and Licensed
11
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category under which the Bayer InVigor® canola application was lodged, the O G T R

must undertake a 9 step risk analysis process as detailed in Appendix 2.14 In doing so the
OGTR must prepare a Risk Assessment and Risk Management Plan (RARMP).15 This
document determines the Regulator's decision on whether to issue a licence or not. The
RAF, and thereby the RARMP, is guided by the GTA, the GTR, the previous GMAC
system, and from general risk assessment principles.16 The RAF is described as a 'broad
framework' that "provides a general guidance and does not attempt to classify the levels
1 *7

of risk."

This is unfortunate as it makes it difficult to evaluate the O G T R risk

assessment process, it also suggests that the 'levels of risk' are open to interpretation
the Regulator. Additionally, many of the terms in this process are somewhat ambiguous
(see Appendix 2) and thereby subject to the discretion of the Regulator also. This is an
1Q

important point as the Regulator is "an office holder with significant independence" , the
extent of which is evident in the GTA, which states:

T h e Regulator has discretion in the performance or exercise of his or her functions or powers.
In particular, the Regulator is not subject to direction from anyone in relation to,
(a) whether or not a particular application for a GMO licence is issued or refused; or
(b) the conditions to which a particular GMO licence is subject.19

The Gene Technology Bill Inquiry recommended that the Regulator, "should be a

statutory authority consisting of three people". Despite the fact that the Regulator "wi

Dealings with G M O s Involving Intentional Release - Must undergo a more rigorous assessment than the
previous category in order to be released. This last category is the focus of the case study here.
14
O G T R , Risk Analysis Framework for Licence Application to the Office of the Gene Technology
Regulator, Commonwealth of Australia, January 2002, p 8-11, These stages are paraphrased in Appendix 2.
15
Office of the Gene Technology Regulator, Risk Assessment and Risk Management Plan: Commercial
Release of Genetically Modified (InVigor® Hybrid) Canola, ( R A R M P ) D I R 021/2002, Commonwealth of
Australia.
16
Ibid, p3. This in itself is problematic. For instance the G M A C system has failed to sufficiently monitor
risk in the past. Furthermore, it is argued that standard risk assessments are incapable of assessing risks and
uncertainties posed by new technologies as the concept of risk can only be assessed when technological
practices are well defined. For further discussion see, E S C R Global Environmental Change Programme,
'The Politics of GM Food: Risk, Science and Public Trust, Special Briefing N o 5, University of Sussex,
1999, p6. .
17
Ibid, p\.
18
O G T R , About the OGTR, www.ogtr.gov.au.
19
Gene Technology Act, Section 30, Independence of the Regulator.
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have an extraordinary influence on the w a y G M O s are managed in Australia" ' this
recommendation was not heeded and a single individual now occupies this position.
Furthermore, the current Regulator has an extensive background in the biotechnology
industry and biotechnology lobby groups.22 The legislative independence of the
Regulator, together with the Regulator's industry background, leaves the OGTR decisionmaking process open to claims that there is a conflict of interest in regulating GMOs in
Australia.

Nonetheless, according to the GTA and the GTR, the OGTR framework must pursue a
regulatory process that:
•

Continue[s] a science based approach to the assessment of risks but including capacity for
formal consideration of broader issues such as ethics.

•

Be more responsive to stakeholders and community views consistent with the legislation.24

This is a clear indication that the Act provides scope for the OGTR to encompass ethical,
stakeholder, and community concerns, in other words, public concerns. To this end the
OGTR does have a number of mechanisms in place that ostensibly support public
participation. In practice though, these mechanism did not impact on the framing of the
InVigor® canola assessment.

20

Commonwealth of Australia, Genetically Modified Governance Issues, Research Paper N o 17,
Department of the Parliamentary, Library 2000-01, p 14.
21
Ibid.
22
The current Regulator, Sue Meeks has been involved in the biotechnology industry since 1984. See
Network of Concerned Fanners website at, www.non-gm-farmers.com.au. Profile on Sue Meek (Gene
Technology Regulator) This reveals Meeks' long history of G M promotion and lobbying. Just prior to this
appointment she was a member of both the Australian Institute of Company Directors and AusBiotech. The
latter describes itself as 'the national body of companies and individuals dedicated to the development and
prosperity of the Australian biotechnology industry. Its mission is to facilitate the commercialisation of
Australian bioscience in the international marketplace.' It also states its aim as, 'To encourage and facilitate
the commercialisation of Australian biotechnology in the domestic and international marketplace'. 11 June
2004. See also, O G T R , Media Release, New Gene Technology Regulator Takes up Position, Dec 6, 2001.
See C V , Sue Meeks was a member of these bodies up until Sep 27, 2001.
23
The Regulator's industry background is of concern to many of the groups w h o took part in the public
participation process. In particular, GeneEthics, Greenpeace, and the Network of Concerned Farmers.
O G T R , Regulation Impact Statement for the Gene Technology Regulations 2001, Commonwealth of
Australia, p4
25
The term 'responsive' is again ambiguous here, does this mean the O G T R must respond to public views
by acknowledging their existence or does it mean that public views must play a substantive role.
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In thefirstinstance the O G T R has two public advisory bodies, the Gene Technology
Ethics Committee ( G T E C ) and the Gene Technology Community Consultative
Committee ( G T C C C ) . A third advisory body, the Gene Technology Technical Advisory
Committee ( G T T A C ) essentially provides scientific advice to the O G T R . What is telling
here is that according to the G T A and the R A F the O G T R must consult with the G T T A C ,
however, whilst it may consult with the G T E C or the G T C C C , it is not obliged to do so.26
The G T A states that the function of both the G T E C and the G T C C C , "is to provide
advice, on the request of the Regulator."27 Although the G T T A C must include one
m e m b e r each from the G T E C and the G T C C C , 2 8 the role of ethics or community
concerns are nonetheless compromised by their marginal status in the process. In the case
of InVigor® canola the final 185 page R A R M P did not contain any reference to either
the G T E C or the G T C C C , suggesting that these bodies did not play a significant role in
this particular decision. Indeed, following a meeting on February 20, 2003, the G T C C C
released the following statement:

The GTCCC expresses concern that a state of community unreadiness exists concerning
the risks to the environment of the commercial release of G M canola, so significant that
the applications should be denied at this time.29

The GTEC and the GTCCC are made up of representatives from: environmental groups,
consumer groups, farmers, industry stakeholders, local council representatives, social
scientists, media representatives, ethicists, ecologists, law academics, and philosophers. If
included actively into the decision-making process these actors m a y have been able to
provide input into the InVigor® canola decision consistent with Ravetz and Funtowicz's
call for the extended peer review of 'post normal' science. Thus, in the InVigor® canola

Op Cit, Risk Analysis Framework, p 8-11, see also Appendix 2, Stage 5.
Gene Technology Act, Section 112, Function of the Gene Technology Ethics Committee, and Section
107, Function of the Consultative Committee, Italics added.
28
O G T R , Gene Technology Committee, www.ogtr.gov.au.
29
GeneEthics, Submission to the Office of Gene Technology Regulator for the Assessment and Management
Plan for DIR021, May, 2003, p 1. Citing the Extract from Community Consultative Committee (GTCCC)
Communique 4 (20 February 2003) also tabled in the Senate Hansard, June 24, 2004.
27
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decision the O G T R overlooked an opportunity to give equal standing to broader
epistemological understandings in framing the decision-making process.30

Other than these formal public bodies the O G T R R A F provides an alternate avenue for
general public participation through the public submission process. This is m a d e
available at either Stage 4, 6, or 8, although Stage 8 is the only point at which the O G T R
must call for public submissions (see Appendix 2), and in the InVigor® case this was the
only point at which public submissions were sought. The Regulator is directed to provide
30 days for the public to m a k e a submission in response to the draft R A R M P , though in
the case of InVigor® canola this was extended to eight weeks.31 However, this supposed
public submission process was not really a publicly transparent process at all as the
Regulator is not obliged to release the submissions to the public.32 The O G T R was
contacted by email in relation to this matter and replied that:

T h e O G T R is not in the practice of releasing submissions on R A R M P s as they contain
personal names and addresses. Hence for privacy reasons submissions are not released.
Another reason is that submissions m a y contain information that is either confidential
and/or commercially sensitive in nature. In addition, and from a logistical perspective,
any one R A R M P m a y receive a significant of submissions, sometimes as m a n y as several
hundred.33

Whilst it is recognised that a number of individuals in the G T E C and the G T C C C do have science
degrees, 8 out of a total of 25 members, 2 of these are cross members of G T A C C , and one is the Chairman
of N R A A V C . M y point here then is not so much that these bodies do not themselves have scientific
expertise, but that the other members w h o make up these advisory bodies bring a range of expertise and
experience outside of that offered by the G T A C C .
31
O G T R , Gene Technology Regulator Releases Bayer GM Canola Risk Management Plan for Public
Comment, www.ogtr.gov.au. The public submission process began on April 1, 2003 and ended on M a y 26,
2003. Given that there is no information released by the O G T R prior to the release of the draft R A R M P , a
number of those w h o made submissions commented on the short time frame in which to digest the R A R M P
before making their submission.
32
See Appendix 3, which is reproduced from thefinalR A R M P and indicates the lack of detailed
information regarding the public submissions. In the end this document suggests that the O G T R simply
categorised the submissions and then offered more information on those elements it agreed were within its
scope. In other words, it appears that the issues raised by the submissions did not impact on the O G T R
assessment of InVigor® canola.
33
Email correspondence between the author and the O G T R , 3 February, 2004.
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Thefirstissue raised in this email exchange, namely whether the public themselves are
concerned about their submissions being in the public domain, is detailed in Appendix 1,
Question 7. A s far as the concern over confidential or commercially sensitive
information, the biotechnology industry is already protected according to Commercial in
Confidence (CIC), Intellectual Property Rights (IPR), and Plant Variety Rights ( P V R )
practices. A s for the last point raised by the O G T R , this is simply not an issue given that
the N e w Zealand Government received over 10 000 public submissions on the same
debate, albeit in a different forum, and each one of those submissions was placed in the
public domain.34

In any case the public did not play a significant role in framing the InVigor® canola
decision as their submissions were not called for until thefinalstages of the process. The
decision by the O G T R to deny access to the submissions makes it difficult to gauge their
impact. The point here though is that the mechanisms for public participation, both the
formal advisory bodies and the public submission process, failed to impact on the
framing of the InVigor® canola decision. This was a direct result of the O G T R decision
not to undertake a more substantial participatory approach made available under the G T A
and outlined in the R A F . This was not only evident in the failure of the O G T R to consult
directly with the G T C C C and the G T E C , and the failure to call for public submissions
earlier in the process, but was indicated also in the O G T R decision not to undertake the
option of conducting public hearings, detailed in Stage 6 of the R A F . (see Appendix 2)

The context in which the OGTR was established reflects the relationship that exists
between the biotechnology industry and the Commonwealth government. In the 19992000 C o m m o n w e a l t h budget speech treasurer Peter Costello announced that the
government would, "assist the biotechnology industry to maximise its contribution to the
34

The New Zealand Royal Commission which debated the GM issue placed each and every stakeholder,
industry and public submission on their website. The public submissions alone totaled 10 861. The N e w
Zealand example will be detailed later in this chapter. Adding to this, N e w Zealand has stricter privacy
laws in place than Australia. The decision not to list those w h o made submissions to the O G T R is also
contradicted by a Senate Committee Report on the Gene Technology Bill which itself listed all
organisations and individuals w h o made written submissions as well as all witnesses w h o appeared at
public hearings. See Parliament of Australia, Senate Committee Report, A Cautionary Tale: Fish Don't Lay
Tomatoes, Appendix 1 and 2.
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Australian economy." 35 This is evident in the politically pragmatic concerns of the G T A
and the GTR, which include:

• [Pursuing] an efficient and cost effective approach regulating gene technology.
•

Creating a more streamlined and certain pathway for industry seeking approval for G M O s
and G M products that can be safely managed.36

Thus, the purpose of the GTA is open to interpretation. Critics argue that "the other,
perhaps even the primary, purpose of the Act...is to facilitate the commercialisation of
gene technologies."37 This is supported by a document that guided the development of the
GTA and the GTR. The Regulation Impact Statement for the Gene Technology
Regulations 2001 (BIS) states that the previous GMAC system was no longer appropriate,
one reason being:

Lack of confidence (particularly in relation to the assessment of ecological impact and the
management of G M O s released into the environment) may also harm the ability of
industry to market G M O s and G M products.38

My discussion does not question that legislation was needed. There is no doubt it is
necessary to address the widespread adoption of biotechnology in research facilities and
the emerging commercial applications of biotechnologies, particularly in agriculture.
What is being questioned though, is not only the failure of the Australian Government to
undertake a more comprehensive debate, but the restricted practice of the regulatory
process itself. Peter Newell details how analysing the industry perspective of
biotechnology regulation, "has provided an account of why some discourses of regulation
35

Costello The Budget announcement suggests that the public's role in the new regulatory system is a
passive one. For an excellent analysis of the political economy of the biotechnology industry, and how the
industry works to manipulates the regulatory process, see, Newell, P., 'Globalization and the Governance
of Biotechnology', Global Environmental Politics, Vol 3, N o 2, 2003. For an analysis of the Australian
Gene Technology Act 2000 which touches on the tensions between the commercial benefits of gene
technologies and the public interest see, Hain, M., Cocklin, C , & Gibbs, D., 'Regulating Biosciences: the
Gene Technology Act 2000', Environmental and Planning Law Journal, Vol 19, N o 1, February 2002.
36
Commonwealth Government, Explanatory Guide to the Commonwealth Gene Technology Bill 2000, July
2000, p 10. See also Op Cit, O G T R Regulation Impact Statement, p 4 for similar statement.
37
Op Cit, Hain, et al, p 165
38
O p Cit, O G T R Regulation Impact Statement, p3.
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are privileged." In the InVigor® canola case it has already been shown that a number of
actors that could well have contributed valuable knowledge or views prior to the drafting
of the RARMP were not called upon to do so. The RAF does state at one point that:

It should be noted that risk assessment is a scientific process that does not take political
or other non-scientific aspects of an application to a GMO into account.40

However, this statement is not only contradicted by the GTA, that advocates the inclusion
of ethical and community concerns, it is also contradicted by Stage 5 which obliges the
Regulator to consult with various government bodies. This statement illustrates the
tendency for the OGTR to adopt a technocratic discourse that marginalises the role of the
public in framing the InVigor® canola risk assessment. As noted by Rehmann-Sutter and
Vatter in the previous chapter, the early framing of risk issues causes 'factual constraints'
that are difficult to address at a later stage.

The Explanatory Memo that accompanies the Gene Technology Bill notes that the
reliance on industry to fully disclose issues raised by GMOs was a major inadequacy of
the previous voluntary system, GMAC, as:

There are difficulties in relying upon industry to provide the necessary information and
make appropriate risk assessment and management decisions. This is because, in an
objective aggregate sense, it may not be in their best interests to draw the possibility of
risk to the attention of prospective consumers and the community generally.41

In the OGTR decision-making process Stage 1 and 2 of the RAF are informed by industry
and industry based science only, (see Appendix 2) Given the above quote, the failure to
39

Op Cit, Newell, p 65, For a broader discussion of the shaping of international biotechnology policy, and
the way in which the regulation of risk defines the biotechnology debate, see, Gottweis, Governing
Molecules, chap 3, 'Modularizing Risk', in particular pl47. See also, Black, J., 'Regulation as
Facilitation: Negotiating the Genetic Revolution', The Modern Law Review, Vol 61, N o 5, September 1998,
pp 621-60. Black discusses the way in which science, scientists, and the risk assessment process act as
'gatekeepers' to restrict alternate views from the regulatory debate. See p 621-7 in particular.
40
Op Cit, O G T R Risk Analysis Framework, p 12.
41
Commonwealth of Australia, Explanatory Guide to the Commonwealth Gene Technology Bill 2000, July
2000,p 12.
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provide independent, peer reviewed scientific knowledge, or alternate understandings of
the impact of G M O s , ensures that the problem of industry bias is embedded in the early
stages of the O G T R process.

The framing of science and technology issues is the most opportune time for public
participation strategies. Not only does it generate broad knowledge of the issue under
review but it can also bring to light alternative technological directions, or alternative
uses of technology. A s indicated in chapter two there has been a renewed movement in
developing public participation mechanisms in the past decade, and m a n y of these stress
the importance of early public participation. In the case of InVigor® canola however, it is
evident that the O G T R overlooked this in favour of a technocratic framing of its risk
assessment process. Thus far, the InVigor® risk assessment undertaken by the O G T R
supports both Rayner and Irwin's view that the inclusion of public participation
mechanisms into existing decision-making processes is largely an exercise to encourage
legitimacy rather than a genuine participatory practice.

Risk Assessment as a Process for Decision-Making

The objective of the OGTR is undertaken through a risk based decision-making process.
The inclusion of public participation mechanisms within this framework is an attempt to
grant the process democratic legitimacy, yet as the previous discussion shows this was
not evident in the InVigor® canola case. Thus, whilst some academics favour a
democratically sound process of decision-making, the O G T R process demonstrates the
difficulty this faces in practice. It also demonstrates the validity of Rayner and Irwin's
ideas regarding the development of alternate decision-making structures. In other words,
for decision-making to be democratically sound there is a need to m o v e away from
current technocratic framing in order to embrace and promote a m u c h broader technology
assessments.

Aside from the Australian Consensus Conference on GE crops, which did not have any
political impact, there have been no public forums in which to debate the socially

34

acceptable outcomes of G E technologies. However, the commercial potential of the
biotechnology industry creates its o w n m o m e n t u m in relation to the outcome of G M O
policy. The 1999 Budget states quite emphatically that the economic outcome of
biotechnology in Australia is of particular political importance. This is further supported
by the role of the C o m m o n w e a l t h Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation
( C S I R O ) in promoting the biotechnology industry in Australia. In 2002 the C S I R O
released a document entitled, CSIRO Biotechnology Strategy, in which the C S I R O stated:

Our mission is to help Australia become a stronger global competitor in the 21st century
through the rapid adoption and use of biotechnologies.4

The Australian government increasingly relies on the CSIRO to generate economic
outcomes through commercially relevant research and development. 44 Ostensibly
publicly funded, the C S I R O presently draws 3 0 % of its funding from private capital, with
m o v e s to increase this to 4 0 % , and has thus developed strong industry links.45 O f
particular significance here is the link forged with Bayer CropScience. The relationship
between the C S I R O and Bayer dates back to 1998, and for Bayer, "the alliance with the
C S I R O is regarded as a model for global cooperation."46 Thus, the Australian
government and the biotechnology industry are not only focussed on the promotion of
G M O use in Australia, but are united in bringing about the commercial outcome of this
technology. Newell argues that economic interests, and the practices of the biotechnology
industry, ensure that:

Strategies of investment inform the scope and effectiveness of regulation and the capacity
of political authorities to provide effective governance of biotechnology. Increasingly
42

None of the three Consensus Conferences detailed in Chapter two had a direct political impact. See
Eisendel, E., Jelsoe, E., & Breck, T., 'Publics at the technology table: the consensus conference in
Denmark, Canada, and Australia', Public Understanding of Science, Vol 10, 2001, p 93.
43
CSIRO, Biotechnology Strategy, CSIRO, June 2002,
44
Turpin, T., et al (eds.) Innovation, Technology Policy and Regional Development: Evidence from China
and Australia, Edward Elgar, U K , 2002, p 45.
45
G M Watch, CSIRO - strategically embedded in the bioindustrial-complex, June 2001.
46
Bayer CropScience, Bayer Business Review 2002: Australia, New Zealand and Oceania, p 13. For an
excellent critique of the relationship between the C S I R O and the biotechnology industry see, Hindmarsh,
R., 'Consolidating Control: Plant Variety Rights, Genes and Seeds', Journal ofAustralian Political
Economy, N o 44, December 1999, p 58-88.
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integrated,...biotech multinationals are a the heart of bargains with policy-makers over
regulations on the development and distribution of G M products.47

As a result, Australia has neglected debate not only over GE technologies themselves but
alternatives to G E technologies in agriculture, such as the organic agricultural industry.
The failure to debate the socially acceptable outcomes of n e w technologies not only
denies the potential to debate alternative systems per se, it m a y also work to strengthen
the position of n e w technologies at the expense of alternatives. For instance, in 2002 the
C S I R O spurned research into the organic farming industry in favour of G E technologies,
primarily due to the Australian government's pressure to increase private funding of the
CSIRO. 4 8 This example highlights the political shaping of G E technologies and the lack
of public participation at these points of decision-making.

The Public Understanding of Science

Adopting a Deficit Model of the Public Understanding of Science

The detail of the public's capacity to understand and participate in science issues, and
their actions in this case, will be demonstrated in chapter four. This particular discussion
will focus on h o w the O G T R understood the public understanding of science in the
InVigor® canola decision. Thus far, it has already been argued that the O G T R excluded
both key non-scientific experts and the public from framing the InVigor® process. It is
also evident that the debate w a s confined to a risk assessment process that denied broad
public debate over the outcomes of G E technologies. Given that these actions worked to
narrow the interaction between the O G T R process and the public, the following
discussion details h o w the O G T R defined key terms in this debate and also its tendency
to adopt a deficit model of the public understanding of science.

47

Op Cit, Newell, p 68.
Whitten, 'Don't Cry For M e , Australia!', Australasian Science, Vol 23, N o 6, July, 2002, pl6. Organic
agriculture had previously been a focus of CSIRO research. Whitten is critical of the Howard government
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The interpretation of key terms in the R A F are central to the public understanding of
science in this case study. A s raised earlier m a n y of the terms in the 9 stage process (see
Appendix 2) are ambiguous; for instance, the definition of 'comprehensive' and
'significant' are necessarily value judgements undertaken by the Regulator. Similarly, the
use of 'may' in a number of respects hardly indicates to the public a point at which these
actions should be undertaken. Moreover, of particular concern to the public in the
I n V i g o r ® canola decision w a s that the Regulator appears to have a very narrow
definition of the term 'environment'. This was reflected in a Senate Estimate Report that
detailed questioning between the Regulator and Senator Cherry.49

Senator Cherry - Coming back to the issue of the environment, are you operating under
any policy instructions from government as to what is and is not the environment for the
purposes of the act?
Regulator - No, the definition of the environment that we use is the one that is in the
Gene Technology Act
Senator Cherry - But that does not exclude the notion of a neighbouring farm
environment, for example?
Regulator - It would only include a neighbouring farm environment in the context of
whether or not there was a risk to human health and safety in the environment.50

The Regulator was in fact arguing that the failure to contain GE crops is not an
environmental issue, rather it is an economic issue for the neighbouring farmer and is
thus outside the scope of the O G T R assessment. This is a false assumption and one that is
challenged by farmers in the next chapter. According to the G T A however, the definition
of the environment encompasses m u c h broader concerns than the Regulator proposes as it
includes:
(a) ecosystems and their constituent parts; and
(b) natural and physical resources; and

in particular for politicising what is essentially a public service as the CSIRO is under increasing pressure
to increase private funding at the expense of public interest.
49
Senator Cherry is a Democrat Senator for Queensland.
50
Commonwealth of Australia, Senate Estimates, Community Affairs Legislation Committee, Canberra,
November 5, 2003, p 151.
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(c) the qualities and characteristics of locations, places and areas.51

Similarly, the definition of 'human health' according to the Regulator is extremely
limited. In the same Senate Estimates hearing the Regulator w a s asked:

Senator Cherry - What research have you commissioned in the issue of human health
effects of G M crops?
Regulator - Directly, we have not commissioned research. Obviously FSANZ does a lot
of work in assessing food products.
Senator Cherry - But they have commissioned no research either.
Regulator -1 am not aware of what they have done, but there is obviously a great deal of
data.
Following further discussion:
Senator Cherry - What does human health mean under your Act then?
Regulator - It can be things to do with occupational health and safety issues. For
example, as I said earlier, exposure to the crop...it is human health outside the food side
of things.52

It is clear that m u c h of the debate in the InVigor® canola decision relates to the antipathy
between the Regulator's position on the definition of human health and the environment,
and the public understanding of these key terms. In the InVigor® canola RARMP the
Regulator often dismissed issues as being outside of the scope of assessment, when in
fact a broader understanding of human health and the environment would have obliged
the Regulator to address them. This issue is revisited in the next chapter.

51

G T A , Section 10, Definitions, (1), environment.
O p Cit, Senate Estimates, p 159.The act is ambiguous in relation to h u m a n health and does not provide a
tangible definition. Section 51 Matters Regulator Must Take Into Account In Preparing Risk Assessment
and Risk Management Plan, (la) of the Act states that in preparing the risk assessment the Regulator must
'take into account' "the risks posed by those dealings, including any risks to the health and safety of
people". The Regulator must also 'take into account' (lb) "any submission m a d e under Section 49 (3c) in
relation to such risks." Section 49 (3c) is that which relates to "written submissions on whether the licence
should be issued, being submissions about matters that the Regulator is required to take into account".
Those matters the Regulator must take into account are Section 51 (la) above and also Section 51 (2a), "the
means of managing any risks posed by those dealings in such a w a y as to protect: (2a) (i) the health and
safety of people." These circular guidelines under the Act gives no clear indication of what should be
considered in assessing the risk to human health, rather, it is left to the Regulator to interpret the meaning
of the Act.
52
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O n announcing the decision to grant a licence to Bayer for the commercial release of
InVigor® canola the Regulator noted that m a n y public submissions m a d e in response to
the draft R A R M P were concerned with; the escape of G M canola into the environment,
herbicide tolerant weeds, and the consequences of herbicide use. The Regulator addressed
these concerns by assuring the public that they had been adequately dealt with by the
O G T R , and A P V M A , and that the "thefinalversion of the R A R M P has been expanded to
more comprehensively address issues raised" in the submissions.53 In other words, the
O G T R assumed that giving the public more information was the key to allaying their
concerns. However, it is evident that this was inadequate. Primarily, the public were
questioning the scientific basis of the O G T R findings,54 so further information was not
the issue. Secondly, the public were motivated by a need to inform the O G T R of the more
practical implications of these issues rather than the scientific understanding of them.5

One of the more revealing documents in relation to the OGTR and the public
understanding of science is a Fact Sheet on the O G T R website. Entitled, Public
Participation in the Assessment of Gene Technology, the sheet illustrates the extent to
which the O G T R 'informs' the public regarding G M O applications. According to the
Fact Sheet, the public can; receive notification of an application, the public can
"comment" on the draft R A R M P , the public can access the O G T R website, the public can
read the application in the O G T R office, or the public can be on the O G T R mailing list.56
In other words, apart from the restrictive submission process, the flow of information is
from the O G T R to the public. This deficit model of the public understanding of science
continues beyond the actual decision-making into the lack of a review process after the
decision has been made. Curiously, the G T A defines reviewable decisions as those that
either; refuse a licence, suspend a licence, or otherwise restrict or impose conditions upon

O G T R , Rigorous Assessment Confirms GM InVigor® Canola Safe as Non-GM Canola, Commonwealth
of Australia, July 25,2003.
54
M a n y studies cited in the R A R M P were undertaken by Bayer or the biotechnology industry in general.
This is noted on the following submissions, Greenpeace, Network of Concerned Farmers, and the Public
Health Association of Australia. These submissions are detailed in chapter four.
55
See discussion below regarding farm management practices,
56
O G T R , Fact Sheet, Public Participation in the Assessment of Gene Technology, www.ogtr.gov.au.
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a licence. There is no review process in the case of a licence being granted. Moreover,
only the licence holder can call for a review.58 This effectively cuts off any exchange
between the O G T R and the public once a decision has been made. This not only limits
the capacity for the public, including neighbouring landowners, to challenge a decision
that they have legitimate concerns about, but restricts the capacity for n e w information to
flow to the Regulator should unknown affects be discovered in the future.59

The Problem of Poor Risk Communication

In the InVigor® canola case there were three key areas that demonstrated the problems
caused by poor risk communication practices. Firstly, the previous corporate history of
Bayer CropScience raised the issue of trust between the public and the information
supplied by the biotechnology industry and the Regulator. The second area related to the
O G T R failure to commission rigorous risk assessment data, thereby creating tensions
between the O G T R assessment of risk, and public perceptions of the risks posed. Lastly,
the failure of the O G T R to implement sufficient notification procedures and risk
avoidance practices for neighbouring farmers further compromised the risk
communication practices undertaken by the O G T R .

Bayer CropScience is the result of a merger between Bayer and Aventis CropScience in
2001. Aventis has a poor record of disclosure in the U K according to a Commonwealth
document,60 and in Australia has often breached safety regulations in G E trials. In South
Australia, workers, w h o were not notified they were working with G E crops,
inadvertently carried seeds from an Aventisfieldtrial in a number of breaches over a four
year period.61 In 2001 the I O G T R criticised the company after G E contaminated waste
57

Gene Technology Act, Section 179, Review of decisions.
Op Cit, Hain, pl71, notes that this exclusion of the public from a review process has raised serious
concerns among environmental groups.
59
In Chapter two Fischer argues that ongoing deliberation after a decision has been made is crucial in order
to raise issues that are not yet considered.
60
Commonwealth of Australia, Genetically Modified Governance Issues, Research Paper N o 17, 2000-01,
Department of the Parliamentary Library, p 22-3.
61
G M Watch, Australia: Aventis Reprimanded (yet again) for G M safety breach, 3 M a y , 2001,
http://www.gmwatch.Org/pltemp.asp?pid= 10&page= 1. Bayer states that InVigor canola trials commenced
in Australia in 1996. Commercial sales began in Canada in 1997.
58
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was dumped on a roadside in South Australia62, and in the same year Aventis failed to
control 'volounteer'63 plants in Tasmanian trials.64 A more serious breach occurred in
July of 2000 when it was discovered that Aventis had refused to comply with
requirements for a 15 metre buffer zone around all of its trial crops to date.65 This
resulted in an IOGTR audit of Aventis sites in which Aventis made a submission to the
Senate proceedings, "dismissing the breaches as not serious and mere differences in
scientific opinion."66 Moreover, an Aventis spokeswoman dismissed the audit itself,
saying, "If they want to waste taxpayer's money they can do so."67 During the Senate
Inquiry Aventis also revealed that it had notified GMAC in 1998 of its intention not to
comply with the buffer zone, but that no action had been taken until the media became
involved in 2000. Some of these breaches are mentioned in general in the final
RARMP 9, yet as the OGTR concluded that these incidents of 'non-compliance' posed
only a 'negligible' risk to human health and the environment they appear to have been
overlooked. This is despite Section 57 of the GTA, Other Circumstances in Which the
Regulator Must Not Issue the Licence, that states:

62

Ibid. Initially Aventis denied any breach and an interim report by the I O G T R atfirstindicated 'nothing of
significance had happened'. It is claimed that the then Federal Health Minister, Dr Woolridge, intervened,
and a more thorough investigation was carried out and found the breach to be of concern.
63
The term volounteer is used to describe G E plants that self seed following the removal of previous G E
crop plants. These most often appear in the same plot in which the G E crop is grown, however, there have
been many instances in Canada in which volounteer plants are found in neighbouring areas. For further
detail see, Warwick, H., & Meziani, G., Seeds of Doubt: North American Farmers' Experiences ofGM
Crops, Soil Association, U K , 2002. (Downloaded from the website of'Network of Concerned Farmers')
64
Op Cit, G M Watch, Australia: Aventis Reprimanded (yet again).
65
G M Watch, GM Police to Check Aventis Canola Sites,
http://www.gmwatch.Org/pltemp.asp?pid= 10&page= I. Aventis has been conductingfieldtrials since 1996.
The requirement was that the 15 metre buffer zone should be planted with non G E canola in order to reduce
the possibility of G E canola spreading into neighbouring areas. Aventis chose to ignore the buffer as it did
not want non G E canola pollen to contaminate the G E variety, which they planned to harvest for seed and
export. Although not directly related to this discussion it is of concern that Aventis were so commercially
motivated that they chose to defy G M A C directives at a time when their concern should have been to
satisfy Australian requirements in order to gain the trust of regulatory bodies.
66
Ibid.
67
Ibid.
6%
Ibid.
69
Office of the Gene Technology Regulator, Commercial Release of Genetically Modified (Invigor®
Hybrid) Canola: Risk Assessment and Risk Management Plan DIR 021/2002, ( R A R M P ) Executive
Summary, Commonwealth of Australia., pl9. S o m e of these breaches related to InVigor®fieldtrials.
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The Regulator must not issue the licence unless the Regulator is satisfied that the
applicant is a suitable person to hold the licence.70

Section 58 of the GTA, Matters to be taken into account in deciding whether a person is
suitable to hold a licence, states that in considering whether a person, or corporation, is
suitable to hold a licence the Regulator must have regard to "the capacity of the person
(or body corporate) to meet the conditions of the licence."71 Although the O G T R
considered that Bayer w a s fit to hold a licence this trust w a s not shared by some
stakeholder groups w h o viewed Bayer in light of the past breaches and irresponsible
attitude of Aventis. Trust in the O G T R as a regulator was also compromised given the
failure of the previous system, G M A C , to adequately monitor Aventis. A s trust is a major
component of successful risk communication these incidents damaged the ongoing
capacity for the O G T R to develop good communication practices with the public in
relation to Bayer CropScience.

As data supplied by industry has proven inadequate in the past, the decision to base the
initial stages of the O G T R risk assessment on information supplied by industry sources
creates a problematic approach to risk communication. In the U K for instance, a
Government inquiry in 2000 found that Aventis CropScience failed to provide adequate
test data on a proposed G E crop, and did not disclose significant statistical differences
between G E and non G E varieties. In Australia, Monsanto has been accused of nondisclosure of information and inadequate research in relation to data supplied to
FSANZ.

The conflict of interest evident in the O G T R process is exacerbated by the

institutionalisation of science within the biotechnology industry. Critics argue that
industry funded scientists w h o provide information to the regulatory process are "biased
towards regulatory outcomes serving their o w n or their founders market interests."74 In a

Gene Technology Act, Section 57, (2), Other Circumstances in Which the Regulator Must Not Issue the
Licence.
71
Gene Technology Act, Section 58, (1) (c) and (2) (d), Matters to be taken into account in deciding
whether a person is suitable to hold a licence.
12
Op Cit, Genetically Modified Governance Issues, p 22-3.
73
Ibid.
74
Myhr, A., and Traavik, T., 'Genetically Modified ( G M ) Crops: Precautionary Science and Conflicts of
Interest', Journal ofAgricultural and Environmental Ethics, N o 16, 2003, p 241.
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review of the draft R A F GeneEthics proposed that the O G T R , at the very least, "should
require as a m i n i m u m that peer-reviewed protocols and papers are the standard by which
data offered by applicants is acceptable."75 This recommendation was not heeded though,
and many of the studies cited by the OGTR in the final RARMP for InVigor® canola are

both industry funded and/or unpublished.76 Moreover, it is well recognised that there is a
lack of peer reviewed research on G M O safety in general77, certainly not enough to claim
an adequate knowledge of the risks posed by GMOs to human health or the environment.

Furthermore, the quantitative data produced from early trials, specifically called for by

the OGTR in Stage 1 is unreliable, (see Appendix 2) The difficulties of reproducing exact
copies of GE crop plants on a commercial basis are raised by Brian Wynne, who states
that the process of genetic engineering is more 'hit and miss' than the industry will
admit. Additionally, the artificial conditions imposed during the development and
*7Q

subsequentfieldtrials of G E crops cannot account for commercial conditions. Thus, the

extrapolation of field trial research to inform the behaviour of GM crops in a commercial
system is an inadequate basis for assessing risk. However, the use of trial data by the
Regulator appears to be conditional. When questioned over why she did not await the
release of a key UK crop trial study and a UK Science Panel Report before granting the
Bayer InVigor® licence, the Regulator replied, "Because the UK farm trials were exactly
that. They were farm trials and we were considering a commercial release application."80

GeneEthics Network, A Review of the OGTR's Draft Risk Assessment Framework, October 2001,
Executive Summary, www.geneethics.org.au.
76
This is noted on the following submissions, Greenpeace, Network of Concerned Farmers, and the Public
Health Association of Australia. These submissions are detailed in chapter four.
77
Op Cit, Commonwealth of Australia, Genetically Modified Governance Issues, p45. See also Op Cit,
Myhr, and Traavik, p 228, Both papers state that both independent and industry data in relation to G M O
impact is scarce. Also, C S I R O , Gene Technology in Australia, FAQs and Issues,
http://www.csiro.au/pubgenesite/faqs.htm. The C S I R O states that knowledge of the environmental impact
of G M crops is 'very limited' and that 'more research is needed'.
78
Wynne, B., 'Bitter Fruits: The Issue of G M Crops is Too Important to Leave to Science Alone',
Guardian Science, S2-3, September 16, 1999. Op Cit, Myhr and Traavik, p230. Authors agree that
introduced genes m a y give rise to 'unintended properties' in the resulting G M plant, with unknown effects,
something not even considered by the O G T R .
79
Op Cit Wynne, See also Crook, S., 'Risks, Regulations, and Rhetoric', in Hindmarsh, R., & Lawrence,
G., Altered Genes II: The Future, Scribe Publications, Melbourne, 2001, pl32, for a discussion of the
inability of laboratory science to address 'real world' effects and the inadequacy of science based risk
assessment.
80
Op Cit, Senate Estimates, N o v 5,2003, p 151.
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It is not surprising then, that in the case of InVigor® canola, the public were unwilling to
o|

accept the O G T R assurances of a "rigorous independent assessment" of the risks posed.
Instead, as will be detailed in chapter four, the public not only sought out their own
experts to counter the OGTR decision, but drew on previous experiences and non-expert
knowledge to inform their understanding of the impact of releasing GMOs into the
environment.

The failure by the OGTR to impose adequate risk communication practices on GE

farmers in relation to neighbouring conventional farmers is a critical risk communication
oversight. The final RARMP states that InVigor® canola weediness, or volounteer plants,
can be controlled by the use of alternate herbicides and farm management practices. To
aid control in adjacent areas the RARMP 'recommends' that a farmer growing InVigor®
canola notify adjoining landowners. Moreover, the RARMP admits that multiple
herbicide resistance is 'inevitable and so obliges GE farmers to adhere to Bayer's Crop
Management Plan (CMP).84 The Bayer CMP recommends that farmers minimise the risk
of multiple herbicide tolerance in volounteers by creating buffer zones and notifying

81

Op Cit, O G T R , Rigorous Assessment Confirms...
Op Cit, O G T R , R A R M P , pi04. That is, alternate herbicides to Bayer Liberty herbicide. Volounteer
plants, both on farm and in the area around farms, are seen as a normal function of farming. The R A R M P
states that of the trial sites in Australia 17.5% still had volounteer G M plants emerge three years after the
growing of G M trial crops, see R A R M P , p 87.
3
Ibid. See Glossary for explanation of'multiple herbicide resistance'. The R A R M P , p 96-8, also states
that the risk of gene transfer between cultivated canola crops is 'high'. Multiple herbicide resistance has
been well documented in Canada with G M crops transferring herbicide resistant genes to other G M crops
with different herbicide resistant genes, for example, resistant to Monsanto's R o u n d U p Ready herbicide
rather than Bayer Liberty herbicide. Canada n o w uses 2,4D to manage multiple herbicide resistant
volounteers. This phenomenon is well recognised in both scientific and lay literature. See for instance,
H u x h a m M., and Sumner, D., Science and Environmental Decision Making, Prentice Hall, London, 2000,
w h o outline the impact of gene transfer and mutation on the function of G M crops.
84
Ibid, p 90, The Bayer Crop Management Plan recommends a number of optimum farm practices that
would be difficult to implement given that farmers do not always operate in the most favourable conditions
and do not always have control over all aspects of farming. For example, the C M P recommends that
farmers, 'avoid spillage during transport, and 'optimise harvest timing'. O n questioning the Regulator in a
Senate Estimates hearing, Senator Heffernan, a farmer himself, challenged the Regulator on the C M P issue
and a number of times made the point that it is impossible to abide by some of the recommendations of the
C M P given the practical limitations of farming. See Senate Estimates, p C A 148 and CA154.
85
This is a furphy as it is well understood that the O G T R and C M P buffer zones are inadequate. This will
be further discussed in chapter four.
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neighbouring landowners. Although again this is merely a recommendation not a
requirement, as the R A R M P goes on to state:

Arrangements between individual growers regarding the establishment of any such
buffers are obviously outside the scope of this assessment.86

In the Senate Estimates hearing the Regulator was asked about UK research that suggests
that 2 0 % of farmers do not adhere to such plans:

Senator Cherry - Doesn't that significantly change the sorts of risks you have to
account for?
Regulator - Again, all I can say is that the situation in Australia is not the same.
Senator Cherry - Our fanners are better behaved, are they?87

Quite clearly, the Regulator ignored the gap between ideal conditions and everyday
farming practicalities. Understandably, conventional farmers were concerned about the
impact of herbicide resistant volounteer plants. Yet the Regulator sidestepped this issue in
the InVigor® canola decision by simply stating that volounteer plants do not pose a risk
oo

to h u m a n health or the environment and are therefore beyond the scope of the Act. In
late 2002, the then Minister for the Environment, D r David K e m p , in his capacity as a
m e m b e r of the Primary Industries Ministerial Council, wrote a letter to the Regulator. It
reads in part, "The overall risks of the introduction of G E herbicide tolerant crops should
be managed by industry self-regulation."89 Clearly, this has been adopted in part by the
use of Bayer's C M P , 9 0 and just as clearly this is an inadequate process for communicating
and managing the risks of G E crops for adjacent farmers.

86

Op Cit, OGTR, RARMP, pl05.

87

Op Cit, Senate Estimates, p 155.
88
Op Cit, O G T R , R A R M P , pl51. Herbicide use and the management of herbicide resistant plants is
administered by A P V M A .
89
Greenpeace, Response to the Risk Assessment and Risk Management Plan for DIR021/2002, M a y 26,
2003, p39. Dr K e m p was acting both in his capacity as a member of the Ministerial Council and as Minister
for the Environment.
90
The C M P is notfinaliseduntil after a decision has been made by the Regulator and moreover some
elements of it are deemed Commercial in Confidence. Thus, it is almost impossible for stakeholders and the
public to judge the efficacy of C M P s .
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Social Learning

Failing to Engage with the Public

For many of the reasons detailed above, the capacity to enhance social learning through
an exchange of knowledge was severely restricted by the O G T R process. Perhaps the best
way to demonstrate the lack of social learning, and public participation in general in the
O G T R process, is to compare it to a similar debate in which the public participated in a
substantial way. The actions of the Australian government in facilitating public debate
over G E crops is in stark contrast to the N e w Zealand Royal Commission on G E that took
place between M a y 2000 and July 2001. Like Australia, N e w Zealand had a previous
history of G M O use, both in research and in imported food products, although it did not
cultivate G E crops.

At the outset the Royal Commission held 'scoping' meetings to determine the breadth of
issues to be discussed. This led to the development of a 'shared framework of values' that
were central to the debate.91 These values included sustainability, freedom of choice, and
participation. The values were then incorporated into three focus areas; cultural ethical
and spiritual issues, environmental and health issues, and economic and strategic issues.
Indeed, the Executive S u m m a r y of the Royal commission report states that the
commission gave "much thought to the values N e w Zealanders hold, to find a sound base
QO

for the findings w e are n o w required to make." This comprehensive framing of the G E
debate was followed by a transparent process, in which all of the Royal Commission
meetings, from formal hearings to public forums, were open to the public.93 In all, the
Commission attracted 10 861 public submissions, all of which were m a d e publicly

N e w Zealand Parliament, Report of Royal Commission on Genetic Modification, Chapter 2,
http://www.gmcommission.govt.nz.
92
Ibid, p 3.
93
Fleming, J., 'Inform, Educate or Influence?: N e w Zealand's Experience of the Debate on Genetic
Modification', The Round Table, Vol 371, September 2003, p 489.
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available along with all the background papers. The N e w Zealand Royal Commission
on Genetic Modification has been described as a "constructive and sensitive approach" to
the issue as its "scope and processes have been unique" in relation to similar debates,
particularly in Australia.95 The chairperson of the Royal Commission, Sir Eichelbaum,
m a d e reference to the social learning that took place, stating:

Few minds may have been changed in the process, but everyone emerged better-informed
and more willing to listen to each other.96

The New Zealand experience raises a number of issues that are relevant to the OGTR
decision-making process. In thefirstinstance, despite unprecedented levels of public
participation and the identification of social, ethical, and economic issues, the final
decision was reduced to scientific arguments over risk. This suggests that at this point in
time formal decision-making bodies are unable to effectively incorporate alternate
epistemological understandings at the point of decision-making. Thus, a dichotomy
develops, not so m u c h between scientific and non-scientific views, but between scientific
expertise and counter-expertise. In the N e w Zealand case the Commission found that the
counter-expertise collapsed under scrutiny. A detailed analysis of this is beyond the scope
of this discussion, however, it does raise a key point for discussion in chapter four,
namely; the nature of expertise in decision-making and the w a y in which some expert
views are privileged over others.

Conclusion

In this chapter I detailed the tension between the OGTR decision-making process and
public participation. I found that public participation in the InVigor® canola decision,
either through formal advisory bodies or broader public submissions, was marginal. This
left the framing of the process dominated by industry and industry funded science. I also

This of course excluded commercially sensitive information, the Royal commission website also includes
transcripts of each and every forum and public hearing held during the entire process.
95
Nature, 'A Sound Approach to G M Debate', Nature, Vol 412, N o 6847, August 9, 2001, p569.
96
Op Cit, Fleming and Op Cit, Nature, both papers cite this quote.
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demonstrated that the O G T R adopted a deficit model of communication with the public,
both in a broad sense and in relation to communicating risk. A s a result there was little
exchange between the O G T R and the public and so a crucial function of public
participation, that of social learning between actors, did not take place. The N e w Zealand
experience indicates that social learning, and public participation in general, is not a
panacea in the G E debate. Rather, public participation is, in part, to be viewed as a
process to tease out motivations and put forward all viewpoints for consideration. The
difficulty is to then base decision-making on conflicting epistemological understandings.
In the N e w Zealand experience broader public concerns became overwhelmed by an
appeal to science at the final point of decision-making. In the case of the InVigor®
canola decision it is evident that a technocratic discourse dominated the process from the
very beginning and thus the public viewpoint was not considered. This obscured from the
debate both a broad understanding of the issues raised by G E technologies, and the
political m o m e n t u m that drives the biotechnology industry. The following chapter,
chapter four, details the public response to the O G T R process through an analysis of a
number of key public submissions m a d e to the O G T R during the InVigor® canola
decision-making process.
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Chapter F o u r - The Public Response to the Office of the Gene
Technology Regulator

T h e probability of improbable accidents grows with time and with the n u m b e r of
completed major technological systems; every 'incident' awakens memories of all the
others, everywhere in the world. T h e world has b e c o m e a testing ground for risky
technologies, and thus also a potential refutation of the safety guarantees of state,
economic and technical authority.1
Introduction to, Ecological Politics in an Age of Risk, Ulrich Beck.

Introduction

This chapter analyses the public response to the Office of the Gene Technology Regulator
by reviewing a number of key public submissions made to the OGTR in relation to the
InVigor® canola Risk Assessment and Risk Management Plan (RARMP).2 As I noted in
the last chapter, the OGTR refused to release the submissions,3 which meant I was
restricted to drawing upon the responses' of key stakeholder groups whose submissions
were publicly available from their websites. I complimented this analysis by asking these
groups to participate in an online Questionable.4 (see Appendix 1) These stakeholder
groups acted as a conduit for broader general public participation in the InVigor® canola
debate, so the submissions detailed here can also be seen as a representative sample of
1

Beck, U., Ecological Politics in an Age of Risk, Polity Press, U K , 1995.
Office of the Gene Technology Regulator, ( O G T R ) Risk Assessment and Risk Management Plan:
Commercial Release of Genetically Modified (InVigor® Hybrid) Canola, DIR 021/2002, ( R A R M P )
Commonwealth of Australia The following submissions were accessed - Greenpeace, 'Submission to the
Office of Gene Technology Regulator: Response to the Risk Assessment and Risk Management Plan for
DIR021/2002', Greenpeace Australia Pacific, M a y 26, 2003, http://www.greenpeace.org.au. Network of
Concerned Farmers, 'Invigor Canola Submission OGTR', Non-GM-Farmers.com, M a y 16, 2003,
http://www.non-gm-farmers.corn/news_details.asp?ID=375. GeneEthics, 'Submission to the Office of Gene
Technology Regulator for the Risk Assessment and Risk Management Plan for DIR021', GeneEthics
Network, M a y 2003,
http://geneethics.org/communitv/modules.php?name=Sections&op=viewarticle&artid=64. Public Health
Association of Australia, ( P H A A ) Comments to the OGTR on the Commercial Release of InVigor® Canola
(DIR 021/2002) http://www.phaa.net.au/Advocacy Issues/OGTR2.htm. Australian Consumers Association,
AC A's Response to the Office of the Gene Technology Regulator on the Risk Assessment and Risk
Management Plan for the Commercial Release of Bayer Genetically Modified Canola, M a y 26, 2003,
available from http://www.choice.com.au
3
See Appendix 3 for the summary of public submissions that was detailed in thefinalR A R M P .
4
Greenpeace, Network of Concerned Farmers, GeneEthics, Public Health Association of Australia, and
Biological Farmers of Australia all responded to the Questionaire. See Appendix 1 for Questionaire and a
2
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broader public views. The submissions of the following stakeholder groups were
analysed: Greenpeace; Network of Concerned Farmers ( N C F ) ; GeneEthics; the Public
Health Association of Australia ( P H A A ) ; the Australian Consumers Association ( A C A ) ;
and the Biological Farmers of Australia (BFA). I have constructed a table (see below)
which provides a brief overview of the contents of these submissions.

These submissions represent a broad range of interests; environmental, conventional
farming, ethics, h u m a n health, consumer, and the organic farming industry. Although
these groups all had their o w n agenda it is clear that not only did their interests overlap,
but that all of them addressed issues outside of their area of primary interest. It appears
that this was not only a result of their individual concerns over G E canola per se, but an
indication that the issues raised by G E crops cannot be addressed in isolation from each
other. This is a critical issue in this case study as it is evident that the O G T R process
reduced the debate over G E canola to a narrow analysis of specific issues, whilst ignoring
the implications of these issues in other areas, indeed, by ignoring m a n y issues altogether.
T o counter this, the submissions detailed here were concerned with pointing out not only
the relationship between the various issues raised by G E canola, but the failure of the
O G T R to undertake a rigorous scientific analysis of the issues that were raised.5

Framing of Science and Technology Decision-Making

Expanding the Framing of a Risk Assessment

In Chapter three I demonstrated how the OGTR risk assessment for InVigor® canola
failed to provide an avenue for public participation in the initial framing stages of its
process. M y purpose in this chapter is to explore h o w the public sought to expand the

summary of the responses. Note that all of those w h o responded to the Questionaire thought that the
submissions should be made public, with the P H A A stressing the need to also release industry submissions.
5
W y n n e , B., and Mayer, S., 'How Science Fails the Environment''New Scientist, Vol 138, N o 1876, June
5, 1993. Short article that argues that the public is not anti-science as far as new technologies are
concerned, but are arguing for a more rigorous scientific basis in relation to the claims made about
technology.

50

Brief Overview of Public Submissions
•

Greenpeace - A very comprehensive submission that addresses all of the major
issues raised in the draft R A R M P in detail; the submission is particularly critical of
poor scientific practices in the O G T R assessment. This submission was based, in
large part, on peer reviewed scientific studies that conflicted with the studies used by
the O G T R .

•

Network of Concerned Farmers ( N C F ) - Primarily concerned with the impact of
G E crops on conventional farming. This submission also addresses a broad range of
G E issues raised in the R A R M P , and essentially argues that the G E risk to h u m a n
health and the environment cannot be assessed in isolation from social, political, and
economic issues.

•

GeneEthics - This submission not only criticises a number of key shortcomings by
the O G T R InVigor® decision-making process, but details Bayer's history of noncompliance in Australia and argues they are notfitto hold a licence.

•

T h e Institute of Health and Environmental Research - under the auspices of the
Public Health Association of Australia ( P H A A ) - A well researched submission
that does not limit itself to h u m a n health issues but also addresses environmental
concerns as raised in the draft R A R M P , and is critical of the lack of scientific rigour
in the assessment. This submission is similar to that of Greenpeace in that it counters
the industry basis of the O G T R risk assessment with peer reviewed scientific studies.

•

Australian C o n s u m e r Association ( A C A ) - Claiming a neutral stance on G E , this
submission is critical of the narrow scope of the O G T R assessment and its failure to
protect consumers through a more comprehensive, independent process.

•

Biological Farmers of Australia ( B F A ) - This organisation did not m a k e a
submission in regards to the InVigor® canola decision, however, they have m a d e
other submissions to the O G T R and remain active in the G E crop debate. T o this end
they were contacted and given the opportunity to respond to the questionaire sent out
to the other groups.

51

framing of the InVigor® canola risk assessment by challenging the interpretation of two
key terms in the O G T R risk analysis; h u m a n health and the environment. The public
submissions not only questioned the Regulator's interpretation of these terms, but
demonstrated h o w they could have been interpreted more broadly under the G T A . The
submissions also detailed h o w these areas of interest, human health and the environment,
were embedded in broader social and economic issues that were not recognised by the

OGTR.

The primary way in which the Regulator restricted its assessment of human health was by
way of deferring consumer health matters to F S A N Z and herbicide use to A P V M A . The
Regulator also supported her view of the safety of InVigor® canola by acknowledging
the acceptance of G E canola in other countries, for example, by the U S F D A . In other
words, although the O G T R would appear to restrict its assessment of human health to that
of occupational exposure to G E crops, it did raise consumer health issues, only to
conclude that they had been adequately addressed by other bodies. In response, the
P H A A submission noted that the decision by the U S F D A to approve G E canola for
h u m a n consumption was "on the basis of a political directive"6 rather than a rigorous
scientific assessment. The P H A A , indeed a number of the submissions, also critcised
F S A N Z , stating that they do not undertake independent safety testing, but rely on
industry data to inform their decisions. P H A A also noted, as did the GeneEthics
submission, that the risks to human health from the increased use of Liberty herbicide are
o

not assessed at all. The P H A A submission goes on to critique those elements of the
O G T R assessment that did relate directly to occupational exposure to G E canola, in
particular, the tendency for the Regulator to base the risk assessment on studies that were

6

Op Cit, Public Health Association of Australia ( P H A A ) , Submission, p 5.
Ibid. See also, Op Cit, Australian Consumers Association ( A C A ) , Submission, p3, 'Effects of G M on
Health and Safety'.
8
Op Cit, P H A A , Submission, p 5, Op Cit, GeneEthics, Submission, p 3, Also notes that the Bayer's Liberty
Herbicide, glufosinate a m m o n i u m , causes birth defects in animals and is persistent in the environment,
moreover, its approval for use on InVigor crops is without any avenue for public participation. This is a
critical point as the use of herbicides is increased in the commercial growing of herbicide resistant crops.
Additionally, if councils are to manage the spread of volunteer G M canola in surrounding areas, as
recommended by the O G T R , then this will again increase the use of herbicides as m a n y of these areas do
not currently undergo herbicide spraying.
7
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either w e a k or not designed to inform h u m a n health matters. For instance, the P H A A
found that toxicology studies used in the R A R M P assumed that;

The tested substance will have an effect on the test animal within a few days...On the
basis of these tests, tobacco, alcohol, asbestos... would all be regarded as safe.9

Animal feeding studies were also poor, with the PHAA concluding;

These tests have not been set-up to measure human health at all, but rather to reassure
primary producers that G M feed will permit farm animals to grow sufficiently to get a
reasonable price at market.10

The PHAA was also critical of the OGTR assessment of occupational exposure to GE
canola crops in relation to allergenicity. In the R A R M P the O G T R relied on a statement
by Bayer that employees and contractors in daily contact with G E canola plants, "have
not shown changed allergic reactions (as compared to the n o n - G M canola) in annual
medical examinations."11 The P H A A notes that there was no information in regards "as
to whether baseline measurements were taken before employment" and what tests were
conducted during the medical examinations. The P H A A went on to state:

Only a properly conducted epidemiological study on a large number of people can
determine the relationship between exposure to InVigor® canola and adverse health.12

The PHAA submission was clearly an attempt to not only critique the scientific basis of
the O G T R risk assessment, but an argument for an expanded framing of the h u m a n health
analysis by the O G T R . In its conclusion regarding toxicology and allergenicity to h u m a n
health the O G T R considers the risk posed by InVigor® canola to be "very low" based, in
large part, on the types of studies detailed here.

9

Op Cit, PHAA, Submission, p 7.
Ibid, p8. Op Cit, ACA, Submission, p 4, makes a similar comment regarding the animal feeding studies.
1
' Op Cit, O G T R R A R M P , p 66.
10
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The submission m a d e by the N C F was also concerned about the tendency for the
Regulator to take a very narrow view of h u m a n health, and also the environment. Not
only because this reduced the capacity for understanding the impact of G E canola in these
areas, but because the Regulator's narrow interpretation of the Act excluded a
consideration of economic issues, and the impact of this on h u m a n health and the
environment. The N C F agreed with the Regulator that "economic consideration should
not override health and environmental risk".13 However, the N C F argued that this did not
altogether exclude economic issues from the scope of the O G T R assessment.
Furthermore, according to a quote from a Senate Hansard,14 economic and social impacts
are embedded in the definition of the environment under the G T A . Yet on announcing the
decision to grant a licence for the commercial release of canola the O G T R claimed that
the Regulator's powers were confined to "deal exclusively with health, safety and
environmental risks,"15 contradicting the broader interpretation possible under the G T A .

The NCF also quoted Section 51 of the Act, Matter Regulator Must Take Into Account in
Preparing Risk Assessment and Risk Management

Plan, which states that the Regulator

must consider "any other risks"16, the N C F suggest that this too, allows for the inclusion
of an economic assessment by the O G T R . The N C F went on to argue that the economic
impacts of G E crops, either through lost markets or the imposition of n e w farm
management practices, would also impact on h u m a n health and the environment. For
example, and this is particularly relevant in Australian rural areas, "financial stress can
cause depression and suicides"17 or otherwise become a health issue. Similarly, economic
loss to farmers m a y disrupt environmental remediation projects undertaken by individual
farmers.18 A related problem would be the cost of undertaking the farm management

12

Op Cit, PHAA,Submission, p8.
Op Cit, Network of Concerned Farmers (NCF), Submission, pl5, quoting the O G T R .
Commonwealth of Australia, Gene Technology Bill, p21.
14
Op Cit, N C F Submission, p 15-6. 22 quoting from the Senate Hansard, December 7, 2000, p 21204. Op
Cit, Greenpeace Submission, p 16. Greenpeace also raises this point in their submission, that is, that
economic impacts were not excluded under the definition of the environment in the GTA..
15
O G T R , Rigorous Assessment Confirms GM InVigor® Canola Safe As Non-GM Canola, Commonwealth
of Australia, July 25, 2003
16
Op Cit, N C F Submission, pi7. The submission made by A C A concurs with the N C F on this issue.
17
Ibid, N C F Submission, see also discussion below on farmers being audited
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practices imposed on farmers by neighbouring G E crops. T h e O G T R completely
overlooked this economic imposition, stating, "the decision whether to grow the crop is
one for the industry itself to determine."19 This shortfall could be remedied in part by the
Regulator undertaking a cost/benefit analysis, which the N C F noted is being considered
in the U S . 2 0

The narrow interpretation of the 'environment' by the OGTR was commented on in most
of the submissions, with the P H A A stating:

To the OGTR, "the environment" seems to be just natural, undisturbed ecosystems, of
which there is very little remaining in Australia. The rest of Australia, including
agricultural lands, disturbed lands, or roadside verges do not seem to be included in the
definition, despite being parts of the Australian environment.21

The Limitations of Relying on a Risk Assessment Process

Throughout the InVigor® canola RARMP the Regulator relied on data, or made
assumptions, that were based on poor risk analysis practices, three of which are briefly
detailed above. These issues were raised in the Greenpeace, N C F , and

PHAA

submissions and include:

• The use of Substantial Equivalence (SE) to measure risk
•

T h e assumption that if 'no effects noted' , then there is no effect

•

T h e tendency to view 'low risk' probabilities as no risk, despite the significant impact
if a low risk were to be realised

19

lb id, pi 6.
Ibid, this could include the cost of lost markets, segregation of G E and non G E crops and grain, and the
cost of controlling volunteer G E canola.
21
Op Cit, P H A A submission, p 1.
20
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The idea of'Substantial Equivalence' (SE), is the foundation of many of the studies cited
in the RARMP and also underlies many of the assumptions made by the OGTR. As

well as the use of SE in the occupational findings the OGTR often referred to SE data i

relation to GE canola itself. The problem is there is no standard measure for individua
crop species, this means that researchers can compare GE crops to any non-GE strain of
0"\

the same crop, whether or not that strain has been altered in other ways. Van Dommelen
argues that without an understanding of the two opposing models as separate identities,
this case GE canola and non-GE canola, we cannot possibly compare them.24 SE fails to
identify risk by assuming that GE canola will behave in the same manner as non-GE
canola.
The O G T R risk assessment, in a number of places, concluded that there were 'no reports

of adverse affects' or 'no anti-nutritional effects' were noted, or there were 'no know
mechanisms' by which an event could occur. However, as the P H A A note above, some
hazards have a long incubation period while others are simply novel events that remain
hidden until their impact becomes obvious. William Lowrance argues that the use of the
'No Detectable Adverse Effect' argument to judge the safety of events, "is a weak
criterion which m a y amount to little more than an admission of uncertainty or
ignorance."25

' Very briefly, Substantial Equivalence is the practice whereby researchers measure a number of c o m m o n
nutritional and protein levels in non-gm crops as a standard to compare non-GE crops. If these standards
are the same the G E crops is deemed 'substantially equivalent' to its non-GE counterpart and thus avoids
further scrutiny. See Glossary. For a critique of the use of S E in assessing G E food, see Millstone, E.,
Brunner, E., and Mayer, S, 'Beyond 'Substantial Equivalence" Nature, Vol 401, October 7, 1999.
23
Commonwealth of Australia, Genetically Modified Governance Issues, Research Paper N o 17,
Department of the Parliamentary, Library 2000-01, p24. For example, non-GE crops m a y have been altered
through chemical, radioactive, or biological processes that can produce 'random genetic changes', p 30
states that in the future as 'second generation' G E crops are releases this problem will be compounded. It
also notes that there are standardised tests for pesticides, drugs, and food additives, and that G E foods
should undergo similar testing.
24
van Dommelen, A., 'The Impact of Background Models on the Quality of Risk Assessment as
Exemplified by the Discussion on Genetically Modified Organisms', in van Dommelen, A., (ed.) Coping
With Deliberate Release: the Limits of Risk Assessment, International Centre For H u m a n and Public
Affairs, The Netherlands, 1996, p47-8. See also, Kasanmoentalib, S., 'Deliberate Release of Genetically
Modified Organisms: Applying the Precautionary Principle', in van Dommelen, A., (ed.) Coping With
Deliberate Release: the Limits of Risk Assessment, International Centre For H u m a n and Public Affairs, The
Netherlands, 1996.
25
Lowrance, W., Of Acceptable Risk, William Kaufmann Inc, California, 1976, p 84.
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In each section of the risk assessment for InVigor® canola the O G T R concluded by
stating that the risk w a s 'negligible' or 'low' or 'very low' and that therefore 'no
management conditions are required'. The suggestion was that a low or very low risk is
no risk. Philosopher K S Shrader-Frechete calls this "the probability-threshold position"26
Shrader-Frechete argues that analysing risk from a probability threshold position is
problematic because:27
•

It does not address issues of h u m a n error or acts of terrorism

•

It does not acknowledge the practical question of where to draw the line that
determines whether a risk is low, very low or other

•

It does not take into account inaccurate modeling of risk

•

It does not acknowledge that although the probability of a risk m a y be low, the
consequences of that risk occurring could be extreme - this relates in particular to n e w
or unknown technologies

These features of the OGTR decision-making process reduced the framing of the
InVigor® canola assessment by allowing the Regulator to dismiss a range of issues that
in a more comprehensive analysis would necessarily be investigated.

The Greenpeace submission noted that the GTR's require the OGTR to assess the impact
OH

of G M O s on "any ecosystem".

Despite this, "there is no ecosystem specific analysis at

29

all", and the O G T R confined its ecological assessment to weediness and the impact of
G E crops on soil. The Greenpeace analysis of the environmental assessment undertaken
by the O G T R was quite extensive so this discussion can only touch on a number of key
issues. The most obvious element of the Greenpeace critique was that they challenged the
scientific basis of the O G T R claims by discrediting the weak studies used by the O G T R
and countering this with independent peer reviewed research. Additionally, Greenpeace
identified a number of instances in which the O G T R quotes studies that do not support

Shrader-Frechette, K., Risk Analysis and Scientific Method, D Reidel Publishing Company, Holland, p
125
27
Ibid, pl34-47.
28
Op Cit, Greenpeace Submission, p 26, citing Gene Technology Regulations, Section 10 'Risk Assessment
- Matters to be Taken Into Account', (1) (b) (ii).
29
Op Cit, Greenpeace Submission, p 26.
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the particular claim being m a d e by the O G T R , in other words, there is an absence of
sufficient evidence for the O G T R to conclude overall that the risks posed by InVigor®
canola are low.30

The Greenpeace submission commented on the risks arising from GE canola volunteers
becoming resistant to multiple herbicides through 'gene stacking'.31 T h e Greenpeace
submission noted that this problem w a s acknowledged in the R A R M P , however, the
Regulator sidestepped this issue by stating that the risks can be managed, and are done so
in Canada, through the use of 2,4D and other farm management practices, suggesting that
this will become commonplace in Australia.32 Greenpeace criticised two aspects of this:
one, that the Regulator failed to address the h u m a n health or environmental impact of
2,4D, which Greenpeace detailed with various peer reviewed studies;33 two, that
management practices for neighbouring farmers are not a requirement of the R A R M P ,
but merely a recommendation. This is problematic given that the Regulator suggests that
farmers should "anticipate multiple herbicide tolerance in order to effectively control
canola volunteers."34 Greenpeace argued:

Even assuming that good management principles appear from somewhere and institute
themselves on the entire farm industry, the Regulator has still failed to assess the long
term implications of gene stacking on the environment. There is perhaps no greater
example in the R A R M P of the deep bias of this document and of the O G T R than in this
discussion of gene stacking. Faced with unequivocal evidence of an environmental harm
associated with the use of G E canola, the Regulator ignores the long term risk, minimises
the short term risk and offers management solutions to the risk that she is unwilling to
institute through the only regulatory mechanism available.35

In each issue raised by the O G T R in the R A R M P , the O G T R either dismisses the possibility of risk, or
else concludes that the risk is 'low' or 'very low' and does not therefore pose a 'significant' enough risk to
deny a licence approval. See discussion of the use of'significant' in the O G T R 9 stage process in Chapter
three.
31
See Glossary.
32
Op Cit, Greenpeace, p 32. GeneEthics also makes this point.
33
Ibid, p34-5
34
Ibid, p39, See also Op Cit, O G T R R A R M P , p 97.
35
Op Cit, Greenpeace Submission, p 32
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This issue is compounded by the assessment of herbicide use itself. Throughout the
InVigor® R A R M P the O G T R referred the problem of herbicide use to A P V M A . Whilst
Greenpeace recognised that this was appropriate in order to licence the use of herbicides,
it argued that the h u m a n health and environmental impact of herbicide use is the concern
of the O G T R . 3 6 Greenpeace also noted that the R A R M P m a d e a number of incorrect
assumptions in relation to herbicide use. For example, the R A R M P claimed that G E
volunteers can be managed in the same w a y as conventional volunteers. However, as
Greenpeace points out "this is patently incorrect" as G E volunteers will need to be
controlled with herbicides other than Liberty, and where gene stacking occurs, farmers
will have to resort to 2,4D. Moreover, Greenpeace pointed out that the survey cited in the
R A R M P in relation to the weediness of canola on roadside verges was conducted in a
drought year, "which calls into question the usefulness of the survey."37

Greenpeace also cites an instance in which the Regulator failed to consider the risk of GE
canola altogether. This was in relation to aquatic systems, the R A R M P stating that:

Canola seed or pollen is not expected to enter aquatic habitats in any significant quantit
and therefore any exposure of aquatic species may be considered very low.38

However, as Greenpeace noted, this "conclusion is not supported by any data and it
would appear not to be based on any assessment."39 That is, assessment of whether
canola seeds or pollen enter the waterways, in what quantities this m a y occur, the
potential risk to aquatic species, or whether this poses a risk to distant ecosystems.40 In
closing, Greenpeace stated that these environmental issues, issues that the Regulator
referred to other bodies or dismissed as inconsequential, are about, " h o w to limit the
spread of G E canola seeds - clearly an environmental issue and one that the O G T R is
explicitly responsible for."41

Ibid, p 34
Ibid, p 33
Ibid, p 37. See also Op Cit, O G T R R A R M P , p 65.
Op Cit, Greenpeace Submission, p 38.
Ibid.
Ibid, p39.

59

The tendency for the groups w h o m a d e submissions to focus on the interconnectedness of
the issues raised by G E canola suggests that these groups recognised the limitations of
relying on a risk assessment process to debate this issue. Moreover, the A C A argued that
the narrow w a y in which the Regulator interpreted its role under the G T A , "has resulted
in a risk assessment and risk management process that neglects to consider wider public
concerns in relation to G M crops."42 Empirical support for socially acceptable outcomes
to be a core component of the G E crop debate is evident from those w h o responded to the
Questionaire. In Question 9 I asked whether those w h o m a d e submissions believed that a
risk assessment w a s an adequate decision-making process regarding the release of
GMOs.43 In response to this question Greenpeace wrote:
The notion that risk assessment can occur absent social acceptance mistakes the nature of
risk. The evaluation of what constitutes risk is both a scientific and a social and cultural
44

construct.
In response to the same question the NCF found:
The problem with the risk assessment and risk management approach is that submissions
are ignored...the submission process [must be] more than an avenue for those opposed to
the technology to voice their concerns and to feel as though they have been "listened" to
and taken seriously when in reality, the O G T R has already made their decision well
before the submission process.45
It is clear that if the key groups here were able to engage with the Regulator in the early
stages of the risk assessment these issues would have been tabled. Moreover,
understanding m a y have developed on both sides about what h u m a n health and the
environment meant for the purposes of regulating InVigor® canola. The previous chapter
argued that the Regulator adopted a technocratic discourse in undertaking this risk
42

Op Cit, ACA Submission, p 1.
See Appendix 1 for complete Question 9.
44
Questionaire, Greenpeace response to Question 9, see Appendix 1.
45
Questionaire, NCF response to Question 9, Appendix 1,
43
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assessment. This discussion demonstrates that in doing so the O G T R was able to exclude
alternate views from the drafting of the R A R M P , thereby privileging industry based
science over conflicting scientific knowledge and potentially creating the 'factual
constraints' raised in chapter two by Rehmann-Sutter and Vatter.

These comments are also consistent with the discussion in chapter two regarding the
shortcomings of relying on a decision-making process, rather then a broader debate over
socially acceptable outcomes of n e w technologies. That is, decision-making processes
tend to exclude a range of broader social and cultural perceptions of risk and public
participation is reduced to playing a token role in the process.

The Public Understanding of Science

The Practical Understanding of Science

The previous chapter detailed the way in which the Regulator, in the InVigor® canola
decision, adopted a deficit model of communication in relation to the public
understanding of science. M u c h of the discussion thus far in this chapter demonstrates the
public understanding of science in relation to G E canola. It has also been shown that the
Regulator tends to overlook the practical difficulties of implementing the Bayer C M P .
Rather than repeat these discussions here, the following looks at just one key issue that is
raised in the submissions that illustrates both the public understanding of science and the
failure of the O G T R to engage with the public on this issue.

According to the RARMP for InVigor® canola the Regulator accepted that there will be
contamination of neighbouring conventional farms through G E gene flow,46 indeed, the
likelihood of this is 'high'.47 The R A R M P states that this is "not a risk to h u m a n health
and safety or the environment", and so only commented on the potential for this to

Op Cit, O G T R R A R M P , p 98.
Ibid, pi07.
Ibid, pi04
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promote gene stacking. T o reduce gene flow the Regulator suggested that farmers
follow Bayer's C M P . The C M P recommends growing a buffer zone of non-GE canola 5
metres around any G E crop.50 This buffer zone should be destroyed, or harvested and
processed with the G E crop. Yet in some instances, where a G E crop is grown along a
fence line for example, this buffer zone would actually be part of a neighbouring farm
which m a y not be growing G E canola.51 The Bayer C M P 'recommends' in these cases
that the G E canola grower notify the neighbouring farmer, with the R A R M P noting that:

Arrangements between individual growers regarding the establishment of any such
buffers are obviously outside the scope of this assessment.52

The inadequate 'recommendation' that GE farmers notify their neighbours, and the
insufficient size of the buffer zones in relation to the spread of G E canola,53 make buffer
zones one of the biggest problem with G E canola crops.4 However, the problem of
buffer zones is further compounded because the Regulator made the assumption that one
of the outcomes of the buffer zones is to reduce the gene flow contamination to
neighbouring crops to less than 1%. The Regulator assumed that anything under this 1 %
contamination threshold "constitututes G E free" in the market place.55 Greenpeace and
the N C F objected, suggesting that this was incorrect as the 1 % threshold is for the
purposes of labeling G E products.56 In other words, under Australian labeling laws, if a
food product contains less than 1 % G E material it does not have to be labeled as G E . Yet
this contamination level completely discounts the fact that farmers will be unable to label
their produce 'GE free' if there is any possibility of any level of contamination. The N C F
49

See Glossary

50

Op Cit, OGTR RARMP, p 104.

51

76/4 p 105.
52
Ibid.
53
O G T R , The Biology and Ecology of Canola (Brassica napus), Commonwealth of Australia, July 2002, p
13. This O G T R study found that canola gene flow has been detected up to 4 k m in the U K and 2.6 k m in
Australia.
54
Canola is quite different from other G E crops such as corn in that its pollen and seed is extremely small
making it impossible to contain. For detailed discussion of this issue see the excellent study by the U K Soil
Association, Warwick, H , & Meziani, G., Seeds of Doubt: North American Farmers' Experiences ofGM
Crops, Soil Association, U K , 2002.
55
Op Cit, Greenpeace Submission, p 18.
56
Ibid. This issue becomes more complicated with the realisation that there is no universally acceptable
level of contamination for trade purposes, the 1 % threshold m a y not be acceptable in other countries.
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stated that the 1 % threshold, "is based on the need to label G M , not on the need to label
non-GM" 5 7 and sought advice under the Trade Practices Act, the outcome being that they
"are legally expected"58 to ensure there is no G E contamination in non-GE or G E free
canola products. A study cited in the R A R M P showed that G E contamination could occur
up to 2.6 k m from a G E crop.59 Therefore, if G E canola is introduced in Australia it m a y
become impossible for farmers to claim G E free status, and furthermore, will lead to
liability issues between biotechnology companies and individual farmers.60 The critical
point here is that the Regulator considered the contamination of conventional or organic
canola crops as an economic issue rather than an environmental issue, and simply stated
that it was beyond the scope of its assessment. Greenpeace and N C F on the other hand,
argued that it is an environmental issue that leads to an economic imposition. Either w a y
it is clear that the Regulator did not engage with the public understanding of this crucial
issue.

The Public Perception of Risk

Besides my previous discussions on risk perception and communication (particularly
issues of trust and poor communication practices) there are a number of other concerns
detailed in the submissions that directly relate to the public perception of risk, and the
failure of the O G T R to consider these. The issues raised here can be loosely categorised
in three ways; the difference between undertaking a risk and having a risk imposed, h o w
the public perception of risk is shaped by proximity to the risk, and the impact of prior or
existing knowledge on risk perception.
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Op Cit, N C F Submission, p9.
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The choice of whether to grow G E crops or not, and h o w this impacts on conventional
farmers, is particularly relevant to the N C F :

There is serious legislative shortfall when the industry sector that has chosen not to be
involved in growing a G M crop is not involved in the decisions of how to manage them
when these decision have resulted in unacceptable costs and liabilities being imposed on
those non G M growers. Our nation should not be expected to market as G M because
someone within the industry has made the decision to grow G M crops.61

Included in the additional costs to conventional farmers is the stipulation by the CMP and
the G e n e Technology Grains Committee ( G T G C ) 6 2 that conventional farmers must
purchase "certified seed every second year."63 T h e primary reason for this is to prevent
n o n - G E farmers from planting their own seed that has been contaminated by G E pollen.
This not only takes a w a y conventional farmers right to plant their o w n seed, and thereby
imposes a cultural and economic cost, but is a w a y of protecting the G E industry from
prosecuting I P R infringements. In Canada this has b e c o m e a huge problem. T h e P H A A
claimed that "1800 Canadian farmers are currently under investigation" and that "perhaps
40 000 to 50 000 have been investigated"64 for patent infringements.

All the submissions discussed here were concerned about the introduction of GE crops,
and I hesitate to suggest that any of them w a s more concerned about this issue than the
others. However, is apparent that the N C F is the one group that will be directly affected
by the commercial release of G E crops. This organisation w a s established in response to
the G E crop debate in Australia and "aims to protect the rights of farmers to grow non G E
crops."65 In responding to a question of where the N C F rates the risk of the commercial
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release of G E canola, out often, Julie N e w m a n , a founder of N C F , replied "10". Reason
being, in part:

It is impossible to contain GM canola and impossible to recall GM canola and yet it is not
accepted by consumers which will create a huge economic problem for farmers.

In other words, the NCF were concerned that the commercial introduction of GE canola
would threaten their livelihood, and this in turn shaped their perception of the risks posed
by G E canola. Moreover, the N C F did not feel that their experience or expertise was
valued in the O G T R process as, "the O G T R disregarded any comment that identified
risks no matter what references were available."68 Furthermore, the N C F did not receive a
reply to their submission.69 Indeed, none of those w h o made submissions to the InVigor®
canola process received a detailed response from the O G T R , although Grrenpeace did
request, and receive, a 'Statement of Reasons' and the P H A A noted they received a
'general reply'.70

It is evident that both the NCF and Greenpeace drew on existing knowledge and expertise
to shape their perception of the risks posed by G E canola, albeit it in quite distinct areas.
Greenpeace's history of environmental activism, and their, "extensive experience in food
and G E issues; extensive legal experience and extensive experience in participatory
71

processes," has undoubtedly alerted them to the types of risk that should be addressed in
the regulatory process. The N C F , as would be expected, claim "practical experience as
farmers" and noted also, "years of research and links to numerous scientific and legal
reports."72 Indeed, the current debate over G E crops, both in Australia and elsewhere, is
to large degree shaped by the experience of North American farmers w h o were thefirstto

Questionaire, N C F response to Question 14, see Appendix 1
Ibid.
Ibid, N C F response to Question 10, see Appendix 1
Ibid, N C F response to Question 6, see Appendix 1.
Ibid.
Ibid, Greenpeace response to Question 9, see Appendix 1.
Ibid, N C F response to Question 9, see Appendix 1.
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grow G E crops. This has provided extensive detail of the risks posed by G E crops,
canola in particular, and informed to some degree the risk perception of all the
submissions detailed in this chapter. The tendency for the Regulator to either ignore these
perceptions of risk, or to defer them to other bodies in which the public are denied a
participatory role, has generated a great deal of frustration among those w h o made
submissions to the O G T R . This was compounded by the widely held belief that the
O G T R had made its decision before the public submissions were called for.74 In the end,
Greenpeace, N C F and the P H A A , did not consider their participation in the O G T R was
worthwhile, the N C F and P H A A commenting that it was "an absolute waste of time."7

Social Learning

Informal Exchanges

As detailed in chapter three, it is apparent that the lack of exchange between the OGTR
and the public denied the potential for social learning to inform the O G T R decision, or
the possibility for public review. What is interesting here is that it appears that there was
a degree of social learning in this debate, albeit on an informal basis outside of the O G T R
process. There are two examples given here; one relates to the coming together of
organisations w h o m a d e submissions, and one relates to an exchange between the
biotechnology industry and the N C F .

The NCF and Greenpeace, although two organisation with quite different and potentially
conflicting agendas, have become allies in the debate over G E crops. At one point, N C F
m e m b e r Julie N e w m a n was accused by Agrifood Awareness as being "a funded
Greenpeace campaigner" to which N e w m a n responded:
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G E canola has been grown in Canada since 1996. See, Op Cit, Warwick, H , & Meziani, G. Evaluates the
impact of G E crops on the agricultural sector.
74
Questionaire, Greenpeace response to Question 1, N C F response to Question 15, See Appendix 1.
75
Ibid, Greenpeace and N C F response to Question 3, See Appendix 1.
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I a m not and have never been paid by Greenpeace, I have however gained a n e w respect
for Greenpeace after seeing the efforts they have taken in researching and clarifying the
*1fi

issues that many representing our own agricultural industry are trying to ignore.

This 'new respect' suggests that the NCF engaged with Greenpeace to the point of
developing a n e w understanding of their viewpoint and actions. Greenpeace also engaged
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with the P H A A in this debate and took advantage of the expertise of scientists in the
research arm of the P H A A , the Institute of Health and Environmental Research (IHER),
w h o drafted the P H A A submission to the O G T R .

A joint Communique was released on June 12, 2003, which detailed an invitation
extended to the N C F by BayerCropscience to join them, along with Monsanto and
various experts, for a meeting to go over the issues raised by G E canola. There were a
number of issues discussed that are directly related to the N C F s concerns over G E crops,
including; costs and liabilities, management and control of volunteers, C M P s , and buffer
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zones. A s a result of this meeting it was concluded that buffer zones would become the
responsibility of the G E grower. This is a major win for the N C F , and the joint
Communique declared:

While agreement was not reached on all issues, the dialogue was open and both sides
were willing to listen to the others point of view... All parties expect this to have been the
first meeting towards ongoing dialogue.79

It seems extraordinary that the Federal body responsible for regulating GE crops, and
providing a 'forum' for public debate over this issue, neglected the opportunity to
conduct similar meetings throughout the decision-making process. This is particularly so
given that this was thefirstdecision taken by the O G T R in relation to G E crops, and
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Network of Concerned Farmers, 'Why Trust the Regulatory Process?', Non-GM-Farmers.com,
December 20,2003, http://www.non-gm-farmers.com/news_details.asp?lD=664, p 8, notes that Agrifood
Awareness is itself funded by a representative body from the G E industry.
77
Op Cit, Questionaire, P H A A response to Question 1, See Appendix 1.
78
N C F , First meeting between BayerCropscience, Monsanto and Network of Concerned Farmers, June 12,
2003, http://www.non-giTi-farmers.com/news print.asp?lD=:450.
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moreover, the O G T R ' s o w n R A F provided scope for public meetings at stage 7 of the
risk assessment process (see Appendix 2). A s suggested in the discussion of the N e w
Zealand experience in chapter three, social learning exchanges are not a panacea for
solving controversies over n e w technologies. However, at this point in time they offer the
best approach to improving understanding in science and technology decision-making.
The failure of the O G T R to encourage social learning has severely restricted the capacity
for either side tofindc o m m o n ground on many of the issues raised in this chapter.

The actions of the OGTR in relation to public participation in the InVigor® canola
decision are not restricted to this decision alone, but have implications for the future of
public participation in the O G T R process. There was general consensus among those w h o
responded to the Questionaire (see Appendix 1) that the Regulator had already made her
decision prior to the call for public submissions. In light of this the N C F and the P H A A
both indicated that they would not continue to take part in the O G T R process in its
current form. Greenpeace notes that their purpose in making submissions is to
"familiarise ourselves with the arguments being m a d e by pro-GE proponents and to
preserve rights for appeal" rather than an avenue for public participation in decisionmaking. GeneEthics indicated they will continue to participate but only selectively as
there are numerous applications before the O G T R . This issue was raised by a number of
those w h o responded to the Questionaire expressing concern about the need to submit
separate submissions for each application to the O G T R as the submissions are quite
detailed and take some time to prepare. Moreover, as the number of applications
increases, the amount of time needed to m a k e submissions will become untenable,
reducing the capacity for the public to participate in the O G T R decision-making process.

Conclusion

The public response to the OGTR decision-making process, and its decision, provides a
clear articulation of the O G T R ' s shortcomings. The public sought to expand the framing
of the O G T R process by challenging the meaning of key terms and the basis of the
80

Questionaire, Greenpeace response to Question 3, Appendix 1.
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O G T R scientific findings. The central problem in public participation in the O G T R
process was thus a conflict over the definition of the issues raised by G E crops. In other
words, what is meant by the key terms; h u m a n health and the environment, and what
constitutes a 'low risk' or what does it mean if there are 'no effects noted' at this point in
time. M y analysis of the public understanding of science in this chapter detailed the lack
of understanding between the O G T R and the public over key issues, such as the purpose
of buffer zones. M y analysis also revealed that the O G T R demonstrated a lack of
understanding over the potential for the environmental impact of G E crops to cause social
and economic problems for conventional farmers. This lack of understanding is also
made evident by the absence of social learning between the O G T R and the public.

It has been shown that in adopting a science based risk assessment process the OGTR
marginalised the public understanding of the risks posed by InVigor® canola and
moreover compelled the public to counter with conflicting expertise. A s the public did
not enter the process until after the risk assessment had been completed these alternative
scientific views appear to have had no impact on the resulting decision, suggesting that
Rehmann-Sutter and Vatter's 'factual constraints' played a role in the InVigor® canola
decision. I a m reminded also of the ideas raised by Powell and Leiss w h o argue that the
language barrier between experts and the public creates a risk communication vacuum in
which views are expressed but not exchanged. In the same way, the conflict over
definition detailed in this chapter was a barrier to mutual understanding between the
O G T R and the public, and in the absence of interaction between them, created a vacuum
into which conflicting views were expressed but not exchanged. O n announcing the
decision to issue a licence for InVigor® canola the Regulator 'paid tribute' to the 'input'
from experts in the InVigor® canola decision-making process, suggesting that these
experts contributed to the decision in some way. In the same sentence, the Regulator also
paid tribute to the public for their 'thoughtful feedback', which indicates that the
Regulator saw public views as a response to the risk assessment process, rather than a
contributing factor. I suggest that in the InVigor® canola decision this attitude toward
public participation was both a function and an outcome of the lack of exchange and
mutual understanding between the O G T R and the public.
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Chapter Five - Discussion and Conclusion

The current simplistic biotech debate has stalled serious exploration of a wide range of
important issues. Moving ahead will require interdisciplinary work equal in complexity to
the topic, not solo efforts by select groups of scientists... W h e n the many points of view
compliment one another in a complete picture of biotechnology, its costs as well as its
benefits, then the biotech debate can begin in earnest - as a debate, a conversation, a
productive exchange and evaluation of views. Perhaps then w e will move beyond the
present angry impasse.1
Academic Jerry Cayford on the lack of formal debate over G E foods.

Issues Raised in the Thesis

My thesis has evaluated the decision-making process of the OGTR by analysing the
outcome of public participation in the InVigor® canola decision-making process. This
decision is significant as it w a s thefirstlicensing process for a G E food crop in Australia.
Moreover, the newly established G e n e Technology Regulator acknowledged the
importance of public participation in science and technology decision-making.

In chapter one I noted the conflicting epistemological understandings of the impact of GE
crops, the general public concern with risk, and the c o m m o n appeal for increased public
participation in scientific and technical decision-making. I argued that in broad
theoretical terms these concerns could be explained as a s y m p t o m of, to use Funtowicz
and Ravetz's term, 'post normal' science - which requires extended peer review to
address emerging scientific uncertainty, and Ulrich Beck's 'reflexive modernity' where
concerns with risk raise dilemmas for legitimising expertise.

In chapter two I sharpened my focus, and against the backdrop of 'post normal' science
and the 'risk society' outlined some key concepts from the S T S literature to help evaluate
the adequacy of the O G T R process as an example of public participation in science and
technology decision-making. I identified three key themes: the framing of science and

1

Cayford, J., Breeding Sanity into the G M Food Debate: the Issues of Concern to Critics are Far More
Complex than Advocates Care to Admit; It's Time for a More Far-ranging Discussion, Issues in Science
and Technology, Vol 20, N o 2, 2004.
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technology decision-making; the public understanding of science - including risk
perception and risk communication; and the idea of social learning. These themes were
used as heuristics to guide analysis of the O G T R InVigor® canola decision and the way
in which key interest groups responded to it.

The OGTR adopted a technocratic/risk discourse throughout the InVigor® canola
decision-making process. This discourse limited the practice of public participation in
this decision in a number of ways. In the main, chapter three details h o w this discourse
privileged industry based scientific knowledge in the early and middle stages of the risk
assessment. Moreover, despite the opportunity under the G T A to incorporate broader
understandings of the risks posed by G E canola in the middle stages of the process, the
O G T R chose not to consult with the G T C C C or the G T E C , or to conduct public hearings,
or to call for early public submissions. This opened up the potential for 'factual
constraints' to emerge in the early and middle stages of the risk assessment process
thereby marginalising the public submissions called at the end of the process.

In Chapter three I also contrasted the Australian debate on GE crops with that held in
N e w Zealand the year prior to the commencement of the InVigor® process. The N e w
Zealand Royal Commission demonstrated the potential value of public participation
strategies to broaden the debate and promote exchange and understanding between
experts and the public. In the end The N e w Zealand debate was reduced to a contestation
over scientific knowledge, albeit it knowledge expanded by public participation. This was
not so m u c h a reflection on the public participation efforts that took place, but the
problematic nature of incorporating non-scientific knowledge at the point at which
decisions must be made. This problem remains a central concern in the S T S literature,
prompting some to suggest the development of n e w institutional structures to incorporate
non-scientific understandings in decision-making processes.

The failure of the OGTR process to engage with public views and experiences earlier in
the InVigor® canola decision-making process led to conflict between the Regulator and
the public over the definition of key terms in the risk assessment. Chapter four detailed a
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number of public/stakeholder submissions made to the O G T R in relation to the InVigor®
canola R A R M P . I asked these stakeholders to participate in a Questionaire to further
inform the analysis of the public response to the O G T R decision-making process. The
public submissions challenged the Regulator's interpretation of 'human health' and the
'environment' in order to expand the framing of the risk assessment process. These
objections were overwhelmed however, by the lack of exchange between the O G T R and
the public; leading to barriers to mutual understanding which remained throughout the
process. T w o of the submissions in particular, Greenpeace and the P H A A , used scientific
expertise to counter the basis of the O G T R claims. In the absence of exchange between
the O G T R and the public there was no indication that this counter-expertise was
considered. The Questionaire indicated that the stakeholders came away from this
decision frustrated at the lack of consideration given to their understanding of the impact
of G E canola. Indeed, according to the Regulator public participation does not appear to
have contributed to the InVigor® canola decision at all, being simply a response to a
process that was almost complete before the public submissions were called for.

Conclusion

The problematic nature of public participation in the InVigor® canola decision can be
best understood as a function of the technocratic/risk discourse adopted by the O G T R risk
assessment process. Chapter three detailed how this process failed to foster genuine
public participation by privileging industry-based science and marginalising the role of
public understandings of G E canola. This leaves the question of why the O G T R failed to
foster genuine public participation. It is difficult to answer this question with certainty but
some plausible hypotheses can be put forward. In thefirstinstance, the object of the
O G T R is to protect h u m a n health and the environment through managing the risks posed
by G M O s . Along with the political will to promote the biotechnology industry it is clear
that a political decision had already been m a d e to adopt the use of G M O s in Australia.
Thus the intention of the O G T R is shaped by the general view that G M O s will be
introduced, leaving the role of the O G T R to manage their introduction rather than assess
the risks according to whether Australia should adopt G E crops or not. The belief among
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some of those w h o m a d e submissions that the Regulator had already m a d e a decision
prior to the release of the draft InVigor® canola R A R M P m a y in part have been based on
the negative outcome of this decision for these groups. Yet, in light of the marginal status
given to public viewpoints in this decision, there is the implicit suggestion that the O G T R
failed to foster genuine public participation in order to facilitate the commercial release of
InVigor® canola. In August of this year, 2004, the O G T R invited the public to comment
on the draft for a revised Risk Analysis Framework. This revision is being undertaken in
order to review the actions of the O G T R in itsfirstthree years of administration. It is
hoped that during this review the Regulator will re-consider the concept of public
participation, and m o v e beyond her current position that public participation is mere
'thoughtful feedback' to the O G T R decision-making process.
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APPENDIX 1

Questionaire and Brief S u m m a r y of Responses

Question 1
At what point did you or your organisation actively engage with the O G T R process in regards to
D I R 021/2002? Did you participate prior to the release of the draft R A R M P , or was the
submission you made regarding this document the first opportunity for you to participate in the
O G T R decision-making process?
Whilst I was trying to establish at what point these groups engaged with the O G T R in
relation to the InVigor® decision the respondents were not specific on this point. All of
them indicated however, that they had been active to some extent in this debate prior to the
call for public submissions by the O G T R .

Question 2
Did the O G T R fail to identify or address any issues of importance to you or your organisation in
the D I R 021/2002 decision-making process? If so, what were they.
All the respondents indicated that all of their concerns were ignored and not addressed by
the O G T R .

Question 3
D o you consider that your participation in the O G T R decision-making process regarding D I R
021/2002 was worthwhile? Please elaborate.
All respondents answered no to this question, with some indicating that it was a total waste
of time.
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Question 4
D o you believe the public participation model adopted by the O G T R in regards to D I R 021/2002
was adequate? If not, h o w do you think public participation in the O G T R decision-making
process could be improved?
It was obvious that all respondents felt that the public participation administered by the
O G T R was inadequate. O n e reply suggested that it was a mechanism for dispersing the
energy of those w h o oppose G E crops and another saw it as a w a y of channeling public
views without recognising them. Another indicated that there should be more
accountability in the process and there was also a suggestion that the public should play a
more substantial role in the actual decision. There were also calls for public hearings and
forums and broader public consultation.

Question 5
Will you or your organisation continue to take part in the formal O G T R decision-making process
regarding the release of G M O s into the environment? W h y or w h y not?
There were mixed responses to this question. S o m e felt it was worthwhile to continue, albeit
in a reduced capacity in order to maintain contact with the process. Other felt it was a
waste of time, particularly as the submissions appeared to have had no impact on the
O G T R process.

Question 6
Did you receive a reply from the O G T R to your submission regarding DIR 021/2002? If so, did
the reply specifically address the issues raised in your submission?
T h e majority of respondents did not receive a reply, one claims to have received a
standadised reply that did not directly respond to the submission made, whilst another
requested a reply and received a standard reply also.

Question 7
D o you think that submissions made to the O G T R by the public should be publicly available? If
so, should those making the submission have the option of remaining anonymous?
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T h e answer to this was question was unanimous a m o n g all those w h o responded, yes and
yes. O n e groups suggested that all industry submission should be m a d e public also, but
without the option of remaining anonymous.

Question 8
What types of scientific evidence or expertise did you or your organisation rely on to support
your submission?
There were a range of responses to this question. They included: grassroots understanding
of the issues, proposing the precautionary principle, scientific expertise, independent and
peer reviewed science, and general 'broad' understanding of the issues raised by G E crops.

Question 9
What types of experience or expertise did you or your organisation bring to the debate in relation
to D I R 021/2002?
O n c e again there were a range of responses to this question. They include: scientific
expertise, medical expertise, plant and environmental expertise, grassroots knowledge,
practical understanding, independent research, and legal reports.

Question 10
D o you think your experience or expertise was valued in the O G T R decision-making process
regarding D I R 021/2002?
All of the respondents replied no to this question.

Question 11
Having taken part in the formal O G T R decision-making process regarding DIR 021/2002 have
you or your organisation reviewed your actions? If so, what will you do differently in the future?
There were a range of responses to this question. All appear to have reviewed their actions
and in the suggestions for future actions include: making a submission to the review of the
O G T R process currently being undertaken; disengage from the process and increase
activities in the public domain; work toward changing the legislation that governs the use
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of G M O s ; call for an independent regulator with no industry links; spending less time on
submissions in the future as they are seen to be disregarded.

Question 12
Are there any other issues in relation to public participation in the O G T R decision-making
process that you wish to raise here?
There were a n u m b e r of issues raised by the respondents here. These included: requiring
the G T C C C to be more engaged with the public; the discrepancy between the O G T R
decision and the unreadiness of state legislation to deal with the commercial release of G E
crops; the suggestion that public participation and decision-making should be undertaken
by another body; the need for public views to be valued in the decision-making process.

Question 13
Other than the submission you made to the O G T R regarding D I R 021/2002, did you or your
organisation participate in this debate in any other way? If so, please explain briefly the type of
action you undertook and at what point in the debate you did so, and why. (ie were you already
active in the general G M O debate or did you mobilise in response to this particular decision.)
As indicated in question 1 all of the respondents were active prior to the InVigor canola
decision-making process. T h e types of action these groups were involved in included:
public speaking; encouraging public participation in this issue; engaging with the public
and collaborating with other groups active in this debate; lobbying; community education;
grassroots activism.

Question 14
O n a scale of 1 - 10, with 10 being the highest risk, where would you rate the risks associated
with the commercial release of InVigor® G M canola? W h y ?
This question drew a n u m b e r of views. S o m e were unsure of the risks as research in this
area is inadequate and so put the figure at 8; another group m a d e the distinction between
environmental risk, 10, and h u m a n health risks, unknown; another response put the risk at
10 due to the degree of uncertainty and the limited evidence that there is risk; another put
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the figure at 10 due to the high level of ignorance, the absence of h u m a n health testing, and
the unpredictable consequences of releasing G M O s into the environment.

Question 15
The O G T R decision-making process is based on a Risk Assessment and Risk Management Plan.
D o you think that this type of process is an adequate method for making decisions regarding the
use of G M O s ? If not, do you think that decision-making regarding the use of G M O s should be
based on socially acceptable outcomes? For example; debate about whether or not Australia
should adopt gene technologies in agriculture in general.
There were a range of issues raised by the responses to this question, including: the need to
assess real world risk; the importance of quantifying the desire/need for G E crops; the
suggestion to address outcomes through a broader framing of issues; the need for
accountability; the idea that the decision-making arena should be more than an avenue for
voicing concerns; the lack of debate over benefits and whether they outweigh the risks.
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APPENDIX 2
Licensing Process for Dealings Involving Intentional Release of G M O s
Paraphrased from the OGTR, Risk Analysis Framework for Licence Applications to the
Office of the Gene Technology Regulator, p8-ll.
Stage 1
The applicant must prepare 'comprehensive' information about all possible hazards and
consequent risks. Where possible quantitative data should be provided from contained
work and early trials.
Stage 2
The information from stage 1 must be reviewed by an 'Institutional Biosafety
Committee' (IBC) within the organisation applying for a licence. This internal body must
assure the Regulator of the completeness of proponents hazard identification and
proposed risk management.
Stage 3
The Regulator considers whether the dealings pose 'significant' risk to human health or
the environment.
Stage 4
If the Regulator 'considers' that the dealings will have 'significant' impact on human
health and the environment it must call for public submissions.
Stage 5
Irrespective of the level of risk posed the Regulator must 'seek advice' from the
Commonwealth Environment Minister, the Gene Technology Technical Advisory
Committee ( G T T A C ) , the States and Territories, other Commonwealth Agencies, and
appropriate local councils.
Stage 6
The Regulator 'may' take any other action that he or she considers necessary. This
includes literature reviews, public hearings, independent research etc.
Stage 7
The Regulator must prepare a draft Risk Assessment and Risk Management Plan
( R A R M P ) . This is based on hazards that 'may' be posed, the level of risk, the likelihood
and consequences of the hazard, and h o w any risk posed can be managed to 'ensure that
unacceptable risks are not realised'.
Stage 8
The Regulator must notify the public of the draft R A R M P and call for submissions from
the public and the agencies listed in Stage 5.
Stage 9
The Regulator must consider the draft R A R M P and the submissions in order to make a
determination on the application and release thefinalR A R M P .
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APPENDIX 3
This is a complete reproduction from the Office of the Gene Technology Regulator, Risk
Assessment and Risk Management Plan: Commercial Release of Genetically Modified
(InVigor® Hybrid) Canola, D I R 021/2002, p 150-6.

APPENDIX 10 SUMMARY OF PUBLIC SUBMISSIONS ON THE
RISK ASSESSMENT AND RISK MANAGEMENT PLAN
OVERVIEW

1. The OGTR received 256 written submissions from individuals and organisations durin
the public consultation process on the R A R M P .
2. A total of 531 'campaign' letters and e-mails (eight types in all were received) and five
(5) petitions were also received, representing 471 signatories. Those that expressed
positions against G M O s in general, or the proposed release in particular, without
raising risks to human health and safety or the environment could not be taken into
account in the assessment process.
3. A total of eleven (11) types of issue were raised which can be categorised into three broad
groups:
issues within the scope of the Gene Technology Act 2000;
issues which are the responsibility of other agencies; and
issues which are outside the scope of assessments under the Act

DETAILED CONSIDERATION OF ISSUES

4. The accompanying table at the end of this appendix analyses the issues raised in t
public submissions in detail. Thefirstcolumn notes the type of organisation that made
the submission and the remaining column headers indicate which of the eleven (11)
issues were raised.
Issues within the scope of the Act
5. This includes matters related to the protection of human health and safety and the
environment and also the suitability of Bayer CropScience Pty Ltd to hold a licence in
accordance with section 58 of the Act.
6. While all issues raised relating to risks to human health and safety and/or the environment
were addressed in the consultation version of the R A R M P , the consultation process
highlighted particular areas of concern, and in some instances confusion. Therefore,
(as outlined in Chapter 2 Section 1) relevant areas of thefinalplan have been
considerably revised and expanded to further explain the evaluation process and the
basis of the conclusions reached as follows:
7.
Issue
1. General Health concerns

Enhanced explanation
see Appendix 2

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Precaution and general safety
General environmental concerns
Pollen flow and "contamination
Herbicide resistant weeds
Applicant suitability

see Appendix 8 and Appendix 4 Section 1
see Appendices 3, 4 and 5
see Appendix 5
see Appendix 4
see Chapter 2 Section 4, Appendix 8
Section 6

Issues which are the responsibility of other agencies
8. M a n y submissions raised issues that related to matters that are the responsibility of either
Agricultural Pesticides and Veterinary Medicines Authority (formerly the National
Registration Authority, N R A ) , which is responsible for regulating the safety and use of
herbicides and pesticides, and product efficacy, including resistance management
strategies; or Food Standards Australia N e w Zealand ( F S A N Z , formerly the Australia
N e w Zealand Food Authority), which is responsible for food safety and labelling,
including G M foods.
9. This group of issues comprises the following categories :

Issue
7. Herbicide use and resistance management
8. Safety and labelling of GM foods

Outside the Scope of Assessment
10. Public submissions raised a number of issues, such as impacts on domestic and export
markets, costs and adequacy of segregation protocols, liability and impacts on organic
status, that are outside the scope of the evaluations conducted under the Act and
therefore could not be considered as part of the assessment process.
11. Extensive consultations during the development of the Act determined that trade and
economic issues such as these would be excluded from consideration by the Regulator
in deciding whether to approve licences. This was to ensure that the regulatory system's
scientifically-based assessment of risks to human health and safety and the environment
was not compromised by consideration of economic issues.
12. A s these issues are outside the scope of the assessment, the R A M P can not give them
specific consideration. However, the R A R M P does have some discussion of these
issues in the sections indicated:
Issue
9. Agricultural practices
10. Economic/market issues

11. Other general issues

Enhanced explanation
see Appendices 3, 4 and 5
see Chapter 2 Section 2, Appendix 4
Section 2.2, Appendix 5 Section 2.2 and
Appendix 7

Organisation key:
A Submission from: A: agricultural organisation; I: individual; E: environmental organisation; F: food interest organisation; C: consumer/public
interest organisation; Pe: Petition"; Ca: Campaign form letter"

Matters within the scope of the Gene Technology Act 2000 (the Act) - columns
Matters which are the
1-6
responsibility of the A P V M A column 7
and matters which are the
responsibility of FSANZ column 8
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